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Great War, Civil War, and Recovery: Russia’sNational Income, 1913 to 1928
The long-run impact of the Great War (1914 to 1917), the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the
Civil War (1918 to 1921) on the economic life of Russia’s citizens can scarcely be overstated.
Their immediate impact was also profound, but comprehensive measures of this are lacking.
Paul R. Gregory (1982) has provided our best measure of the real national product of the
Russian Empire, based on final expenditures, year by year from 1885 to 1913. The annual record
begins again in 1928 with Abram Bergson (1961) (GNP by final uses in 1928 and subsequent
benchmark years), Moorsteen and Powell (1966) (GNP by sector of origin, 1928 and annually
thereafter to 1966), and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA 1982, 1990) (GNP from 1950
to 1985), summarized by Ofer (1987). The interval from 1913 to 1928 is left.
Why does the gap matter? The real national income of a country is, after all, only one
dimension of its national experience. In this case, however, it is a missing dimension. Without it,
we cannot offer conclusive judgments about the performance of Russia’s wartime economy.
How effectively did alternative government policies and economic systems mobilize the
economy in time of war? After seven years of international and civil conflict, how great and how
persistent were the damage and losses? It is not easy to judge the pace of the postwar recovery
when we do not know exactly the scale of the catastrophe that recovery was from. It is also
important to understand the starting point of Soviet industrialization under Stalin’s five-year
plans. By 1928, was the Soviet recovery from Russia’s Great War and Revolution complete,
adjusted for territorial change? Had national income per head, on average, returned to its 1913
benchmark by 1928? The answer has a clear bearing on the success or otherwise of Stalin’s early
five-year plans.
The missing years have a wider significance beyond Russia. The horrors of war and civil war
in Russia were not unique. By filling the gap we aim to place Russia more precisely in the
spectrum of national experiences of war and civil war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
In this paper we consider, first, the legacy of our predecessors and, in that context, the
contributions we can hope to make. Second, we review the economic and demographic
challenges presented by the changing borders of Russia and the Soviet Union. In the third
section we discuss Russia’s national income in 1913, our chosen base year. The fourth section
sets out our detailed results. Fifth, we place our results in an international comparative context
and, sixth, in the context of more than a century of Russian and Soviet economic growth. The
final section concludes.1. Starting Points
We are not the first to labor in this vineyard. Sectoral and national income and production
estimates were previously compiled and published within Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union by
Prokopovich (1918b), Litoshenko (1925, 1927), Groman (1927), Gukhman (1928), Varzar (1929),
2and various official agencies including Gosplan (1929), TsUNKhU (1939), and TsSU (1957). Some
of these have been helpfully collated by Poletaev (1998). Outside Russia we note Prokopovich
(1930), Nutter (1963), Falkus (1968), Gatrell and Harrison (1993), and Gatrell (2005). In Appendix
A we report and compare these estimates in more detail.
None of these estimates was complete, consistent, and internationally comparable in
relation to the period, territory, and branches of activity that were covered. Some estimates
took into account only industry and agriculture. As we discuss below, nearly all estimates
conformed, intentionally or by default, to a material-product concept that excluded the
contribution of final services to national income. A number of estimates incorporated significant
statistical biases.
In the west there have been concerted efforts to understand the quantitative changes in the
Soviet economy of 1928 compared with the Russian economy in 1913. The multi-author
collections edited by Davies (1990) and Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft (1994) included
chapters on national income by Gregory (1990), on agriculture by Wheatcroft (1990), on
statistics, population, and agriculture by Davies and Wheatcroft (1994a,b,c), on transport by
Westwood (1990, 1994), and specifically on the Great War and Civil War by Gatrell (1994).
Of all past attempts to understand what happened to Russian national income, by far the
cleanest are those of Gregory. Gregory (1982) built up his expenditure-side figures from nominal
outlays up to 1913, and also in 1928, deflated by price indices. Gregory (1990) modified the
1928 comparison in response to criticisms by Wheatcroft, Davies, and Cooper (1986). The result
is a glass bridge across the gap from 1913 to 1928, providing consistent and comparable
estimates of Soviet real national income in the final year relative to the initial year. As Table 1
shows, Gregory found that by 1928 real national income exceeded the 1913 level (within Soviet
frontiers) by at most 6.5 percent; since the population on that territory increased by more,
average incomes declined somewhat over the years that lay between.
As yet, we lack definitive measures of aggregate economic performance for the years in
between. This lack has not deterred scholars from setting out to evaluate the changing Soviet
economic policies and institutions over this period. Useful studies of the economic organization
of Soviet Russia from the Bolshevik Revolution through the Civil War and the years of recovery
include Dobb (1949), Carr (1952), Zaleski (1962), Nove (1972), Davies (1989), Malle (1985), and
Boettke (1990). More specialized studies have given attention to agriculture and the peasantry
(Kabanov 1988, Figes 1989; Lih 1990; Litoshenko 2001), industry (Kafengaus 1993), urban
consumption and trade (Hessler 2004), the famine (Adamets 2006), public finance (Goland 2006;
McMeekin 2009; Osokina 2009), and labour (Il’iukhov 2010) in this period.
Allen’s (2003) reevaluation of Soviet economic development over the longer term does not
address the Great War-Civil War period specifically but has important implications that we will
address.
The page from which we start is not, therefore, completely blank, but there are significant
gaps and discrepancies. To what extent and to what effect can we improve on what already
exists? Our contributions to Russian national accounting fall under three headings –
intertemporal completeness; conceptual improvement; and explicit consideration of the welfare
aspect of national income in wartime.
3First, we provide intertemporal completeness. We fill in all years of this turbulent period.
Second, we improve conceptually on existing measures of Russian and Soviet wartime GNP.
Russian national accounting has been dogged by the legacy of the “material product system.”
This was formalized by the United Nations after World War II (UN 1971), but its intellectual
roots go back to Adam Smith and before, and go deep into the thinking of many that would be
unfamiliar with its methodological detail. The material product of a society is based on the value
of physical commodities produced; this includes the value of intermediate services, such as
freight transport, consumed in their production, but excludes services of all kinds (civilian and
military, provided privately and by the government) that meet final demand. It has a natural
appeal for all that prefer the counting of things over intangible services that are consumed in
the same moment that they are produced. This includes many economic historians, given the
priority that our discipline has traditionally granted to industrial over commercial revolution.
These preferences are present in all previous estimates of Russia’s national income that extend
into the period of Great War and Civil War.
Yet, for good reason, the GNP-based “system of national accounts,” which the 2008 SNA is
the most recent version (UN 2009), insists that national income should include the value added
by the factors of production engaging in producing all goods and services, including services that
satisfy final demands. Final services contribute to consumer utility and social welfare. To omit
them would make much economic growth in Europe and North America disappear (Broadberry
2006). Even in the short run, the neglect of final services would result in significant distortion if
the final services component of GNP were to change sharply. National security is, by convention,
a final demand, and the military services that produce it are a final use of resources. In wartime,
when the share of the economy devoted to producing military services is relatively expanded. A
national income concept that omitted this would ignore a vital discontinuity in the pace of
economic activity.
This is what the international conventions say; is it right? It leads to our third contribution.
We will offer explicit consideration of the welfare aspects of warfare. The measurement of GNP
in wartime raises ethical issues, reviewed recently by Harrison (1996) and Higgs (2006). In
principle, GNP should measure the aspect of social welfare that is associated with the provision
of goods and services. There is then a paradox in war booms, when war and GNP move
oppositely. War reduces social welfare, yet wartime mobilization may raise GNP, measured on a
basis that includes military services as an addition to GNP. (In the same way, a crime wave
lowers welfare, but crime fighting adds to GNP.)
There are two ways to resolve this paradox. One way is surgical: to exclude expenditures on
national defense from GNP. In this perspective, defense is not a final service but an intermediate
one that contributes to the costs of maintaining society (Higgs 2006). Accordingly, we should
redefine defense as an intermediate use of resources, and count only civilian goods and services
as final contributions to social welfare. On this basis, the paradox goes away because the
outbreak of war shifts GNP and social welfare in the same direction – downwards.
The surgical procedure is a not unattractive solution, but leaves us with the same problem
as with surgery generally: where to stop cutting. On the surgical criterion we should also cut the
costs of policing out of GNP, because policing is an input into personal security. Going further,
4should we not also cut away the value of basic housing, fuel, and food? These are essential
inputs into personal maintenance; without them, people would die off and so society would
break down. In other words, housing, fuel, and food are costs of society’s upkeep, just like
defense; if defense should be removed from GNP, so should they. In fact, just about everything
can potentially be removed from GNP on the basis that it is intermediate to some other final
goal.
Another problem with the surgical approach is that it would violate the international
conventions on GNP that now give a more or less universal answer to what we mean by national
income. Imperfect as the rules may be, it is questionable whether we should deviate
unilaterally. One result would be to destroy the comparability of measures of Russian economic
growth and development over both time and space, and what then is the point of producing
them?
There are other solutions to the paradox that allow us reasonably to conserve existing
conventions on the measurement of GNP. One involves a thought experiment. When war breaks
out welfare declines and GNP rises but, without the increase in GNP, welfare would presumably
decline by even more. In this sense the output generated to wage war contributes positively to
social welfare since, in its absence, society would be undefended and so worse off. This is one
reason why military services ought to count positively in GNP.
There is one powerful objection to this argument: the case of civil war. When one part of a
society wages war on each other, what is the “society” that stands to benefit from “national
defense”? Civil war is a negative-sum game, since the military spending of each faction is not
only to the detriment of the other, but also to the detriment of all. Note that, if this argument
applies to civil wars, then it must apply to all wars. If we are one race, the human race, sharing a
single planet, then all wars are fratricidal. It is a problem, however, that international relations
are governed by a prisoner’s dilemma: conditional on the possibility of international conflict, the
dominant strategy of each nation must be to protect its own welfare by force. Thus, we include
the military spending of each nation when we aggregate GNPs up to a global measure of
economic development – world GNP – despite the fact that military competition is a detriment
for the world as a whole. If we apply this logic globally, is there any reason not to extend it to
the fractions of society that engage in civil conflict with each other? One reason might be the
principle of legitimate force. Under international law it is legitimate for states to maintain armed
forces, whereas the preparation of civil war is always a crime under domestic law.
Finally, Abram Bergson (1961) argued cogently that, whether or not it corresponds with
actual social welfare, GNP as conventionally measured does at least represent an observation of
society’s productive possibilities, or the potential to deliver social welfare under alternative
conditions – for example, the absence of war. Objections to this line of reasoning (Rosefielde
and Pfouts 1995; Rosefielde 2005) are based primarily on the presumed divergence of Soviet
“planned” prices from proportionality of marginal rates of transformation and substitution.
These objections do not seem to be compelling in the present case, given that our base year is
1913 when Russia was still a relatively free market economy.
To conclude, we have no original solutions to the paradox of GNP in wartime. Our default is
to follow convention so as to produce measures of GNP that, whatever they mean, are at least
5internationally recognizable and comparable with national accounts of other periods and other
countries. At the same time we will, where appropriate, make explicit the welfare implications.
This will be our third contribution. Even then, having measured output and incomes, we will not
have measured human development or the economic aspect of well being. When inequality is
changing, for example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) have proposed that the trend in welfare
may be captured by the average of logs of personal incomes better than average incomes. This
is far beyond what we can do now, and is likely to remain out of reach.2. Territory and Population
Between 1913 and 1928 the territory that we are accounting for changed. The Russian Empire
disintegrated and was reassembled. During the revolutionary upheaval, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia left the Russian Empire. Then, in
Central Asia the territories of Khiva and Bukhara were incorporated into the Soviet Union, a
process formalized in February 1925 by the creation of the Uzbek and Turkmen union republics
(Carr 1959, pp. 288-289). Table 2 lists the effects of these changes on the territory and
population of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The net effect on territory was small;
the land surface under Moscow’s dominion in the 1920s was reduced by less than three per
cent, compared with that under St Petersburg in 1913. Since the areas lost were densely settled,
the effect on population was dramatic, removing one fifth of the official residents of the Empire
of 1913 from Moscow’s control.
The confusion of border changes raises the question of what national entity and associated
territory we should take for our 1913 baseline. One option would be the Russian Empire,
perhaps excluding Poland and Finland. We can follow what happened on this territory through
1917, but no further. Our other option is to take the territory of the Soviet state within the
frontiers of 1925 to 1939 (“interwar borders”) as our benchmark. What happened on this
territory can be tracked back to 1913, either from estimates made retrospectively in the 1920s
or, where possible, by ourselves deducting the western regions from the Empire. We then
follow it through the years after 1917 with relative ease.
As shown in Table 2, the population of the Russian empire (excluding Poland and Finland) in
1913 was officially some 159 million; on the same official figures, the number of people living on
the territory of the future Soviet state in the same year, at 138 million, was more than 20 million
less. These figures require correction. Government statistics overstated the population of the
Russian Empire. The only census of the imperial population was held in 1897. Over the years
that followed, in the rural localities of European Russia, the authorities correctly registered
births and deaths but failed to count the out-migration of peasants to cities or to Siberia. At the
same time, these newcomers were counted at their new places of residence. As a result, they
appeared twice in the demographic statistics. This double counting accumulated for almost
twenty years.
The scale of correction required is not completely clear. Statisticians were aware of the
problem at the time. In the 1920s there were several attempts, reviewed by Vainshtein (1960),
to estimate the true numbers. Because these authors generally did not describe their
6methodologies, it is hard for us prefer one correction over another. Nearer to our own time,
working forward from the 1897 census on the basis of births, deaths, and net migration in each
year, Sifman (1977) proposed to subtract 5.38 percent from the 1914 population, and it is this
that provides our point of departure.
Table 2 shows the corrected population of the Russian Empire at the beginning of 1913
(excluding Poland and Finland) as 150 millions. Correspondingly, about 133 million people lived
on future Soviet territory in the same year. Appendix B provides full details of this transition. By
1928, the Soviet population had grown to 152 millions – a relatively safe figure, based on the
first Soviet census of 1926. Accounting for what happened between 1913 and 1926 is, in
contrast, uncertain. Three demographic catastrophes overlapped, arising from the Great War,
the Civil War, and a postwar famine. Apportioning deaths among them is a hazardous and
unfinished business; Vyshnevskii (2006) reviews previous attempts. To summarize the appendix
briefly, we divide the period into 1913 to 1918 and 1920 to 1928. In the first period, we start
from Sifman’s corrected 1914 population figure. For 1913 and 1915 to 1918 we apply annual
birth and death rates from Boiarskii (1948), with war losses and net migration, forced and
voluntary, from Volkov (1930). From the closing stage of the Civil War (1920) to the first USSR
population census (1926), we use figures reconstructed by Andreev, Darskii, and Khar’kova
(1993).1 That leaves 1919, for which we average 1918 and 1920.
Table 3 presents the results of our reconstruction.2 Series for Soviet interwar territory and
the Russian empire both show an increase in the population during the first years of the Great
War. After 1915 trends diverge. On the Empire territory population then fell continuously until
the data come to an end. The main factors were a rise in mortality and (to a smaller extent) a
drop in fertility. On Soviet territory, in contrast, the population continued to grow until 1918.
The reason was that an incoming wave refugees from the borderland territories of the future
independent states, which were strongly affected by conflict, to the interior regions of the
Empire that would later form the Soviet Union. The influx onto Soviet territory more than offset
the decline in the indigenous population. It came to an end when the Empire collapsed and
Russia’s Great War ended. Then the Civil War began and the Soviet population went into decline
for several years. Its net natural increase remained negative because of high death rates
associated with combat, infectious diseases, and famine. At the same time the earlier inward
migration was partly reversed because some wartime refugees from the borderlands returned
home, leaving Soviet territory to do so, and some indigenous inhabitants joined the White
1 For full details see Appendix B. Andreev et al. (1993) provide three variants for the early
years, based on higher, lower, and median estimates of mortality. We use the higher mortality
series on the basis of a study on mortality by Adamets (2003). We further correct the figure for
net migration used by Andreev et al. for a misprint that they took over from their original
source, Maksudov (1989).
2 In this and other tables, numbers are italicized when they are found by interpolation on
other series or extrapolation from preceding or subsequent years.
7emigration. Only after 1923 did population growth resume at the rate of 2.5 million per year on
average.
Over the turbulent decade from the first day of 1914 to the last of 1923, the net change of
the population on Soviet territory was positive by a small margin. We account for the
components of this increase as follows (in thousands):3
1. Net increase 3,834
2. Births, total 52,156
3. Deaths, total -49,994
Of which,
4. Normal deaths -36,958
5. Excess deaths (row 4, less 5) -13,037
Of which,
6. Military deaths, 1914 to 1917 -1,626
7. Other excess deaths (row 6, less 7) -11,411
8. Net migration 1,672
“Excess” deaths are not the exact number that were killed or died prematurely as a direct result
of the Great War and Civil War, for this number is not knowable. Rather, it is the least number
that must have been killed or died prematurely because of warfare, given the peacetime
probability that some would have died anyway. Our figure of 13 million excess deaths falls
between the 12 million proposed by Boiarskii (1948) and the 13.8 million found by Maksudov
(1989).
3 For full details, see Appendix B, Table B-3. Our starting point is the 3.8 million net increase
found by subtracting the population of 1913 (working forward from the 1897 census) from that
of 1924 (working backwards from the 1926 census). We calculate the total of births from fertility
rates of Boiarskii (1948), based on the age composition of the population from 1926 census and
aging factors. The total of deaths is based on civilian death rates from Boiarskii (1948) for 1914
to 1917, Great War military losses from Volkov (1930), and total death rates from Adamets
(2003) for 1918 and 1919 and Andreev et al (1993) for 1920 to 1928. We project normal losses
on the base of average mortality in the years before and after the decade. Subtracting normal
from total mortality leaves 13 million excess deaths. Thus the total number of births over the
decade exceeded the total number of deaths by 2.16 millions. Since this falls short of the net
increase in the population, we estimate net migration as the residual. The inflow of refugees
from the Western provinces of the Empire before 1918 exceeded the combined sum of the
return migration after this year and the White emigration by 1.67 million people. Because the
White emigration was about 2 million people it follows that, of the inward refugees, 3.67 million
resettled in the USSR. This result is consistent with the findings of Volkov (1930) and Gatrell
(1999), who report that report 9.7 million as the gross number of inward refugees, and 4.75
million as the number that were registered as having subsequently left Soviet territory; an
unknown fraction of the remaining 4.95 million also left without being registered.
83. Values and Prices
The importance of index number relativity for Russian and Soviet economic history has been
recognized since Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1951) work on Soviet machinery output identified
the gap between alternative measures of the change in economic volume when price and
quantity changes are negatively correlated.
We calculate the real national income of Russia and the Soviet Union only in the prevailing
prices of 1913. We do not expect revaluation in the prices of 1928 to be either meaningful or
informative. With regard to meaning, the most important consideration is that in 1913 Russia
had a relatively free and open market economy, participating extensively in world trade, with
market prices responding flexibly to supply and demand. From this point of view the national
income of 1928, revalued at 1913 prices, has a reasonably clear economic meaning.
The economic meaning of the national income of 1913, revalued at the prices of 1928, is not
so clear. By 1928, the Soviet economy had been cut off from the world by a state monopoly of
foreign trade. Domestic prices were distorted by controls, subsidies, and pervasive market
disequilibria. The terms of peasant trade with industry were much less favorable than before
(Harrison 1990, pp. 113, 288; Allen 2003, p. 83). Bolshevik interventions sought increasingly to
control both prices and quantities (Harrison 2008). In fact, when Abram Bergson (1961)
surveyed the interwar years for the closest approximation to market-clearing prices, he
preferred 1937 to 1928 – which says little for 1937, but even less for 1928. This is why we do not
expect revaluation in the prices of 1928 to be particularly meaningful.
The reason we do not expect it to be productive is more practical. A change in base-year
prices will affect comparisons of economic volumes across time only in the presence of
structural change. If relative volumes do not change, change in relative prices will leave volume
measures unaffected. We will see in Table 4 that the sector shares of the main branches in value
added, calculated at 1913 prices, were as follows:
Agriculture
Civilian non-
agriculture
Military
services NNP
1913 44.4% 54.3% 1.3% 100%
1920 53.0% 36.5% 10.5% 100%
1927/28 44.9% 54.6% 0.5% 100%
Branch shares in the Soviet economy in 1927/28 were nearly identical to those of the Russian
economy in 1913.4 There was some within-sector change: in agriculture, livestock and industrial
4 From 1922 to 1930, annual Soviet economic accounts were organized on the basis of the
“economic year,” which ran from October to September, i.e. from harvest to harvest. Our usage
follows the rule that “1922” refers to the calendar year, while “1922/23” is the economic year,
running from October 1, 1922, to September 30, 1923. This is why, in Table 3, we were at pains
to identify the July 1 (mid-calendar year) and April 1 (mid-economic year) population totals
separately.
9crops expanded at the expense of grains, and in industry large scale public establishments
squeezed the private artisan sector. These changes were very limited. The effect is that
revaluing industrial commodities relative to agricultural produce would leave the comparison of
1928 to 1913 approximately unchanged. To this extent, revaluation in the prices of 1928 would
be unproductive.
The figures do show that sector shares varied a lot in intervening years; it was only the
starting and finishing points that were roughly similar. In wartime civilian nonagriculture lost
ground relatively as well as absolutely, and would be relatively favored by a shift to 1928 prices.
Because of this, revaluing everything in terms of 1928 would make the wartime decline look still
more catastrophic and the recovery correspondingly steeper. This is what makes the choice of
base year non-trivial. But we would not learn anything from it that we do not know already.
A completely separate reason to question our choice of 1913 as a benchmark is the
argument that it may have been an abnormal year. There was a bumper harvest of food grains,
much above the trend since 1885 (Harrison 1994, p. 333n). This prompted Wheatcroft, Davies,
and Cooper (1986), Davies (1990), and Harrison (1994) to recommend that the 1920s should be
benchmarked against the non-agricultural production of 1913 combined with agricultural
production averaged over 1909 to 1913.
We reject this procedure. What happened in 1913 happened. If smoothing is required, it
should be done after calculating the national income, not in the course of doing so. If smoothing
is applied to the grain harvest, moreover, consistency requires that it should also be done to the
other four fifths of national income. But this turns out to be unnecessary. The log-linear trend of
average real incomes from 1885 to 1912 predicts the outcome in 1913 within one half of one
per cent.5 For the economy as a whole, in other words, 1913 was a normal year.4. Real National Income
In Table 4, we estimate the real national income of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union by
sector of origin. We start from the production branch structure of net value added in 1913 on
the territories of the Russian Empire (excluding Finland) and the USSR within interwar borders.
We use these to weight annual series of branch production, rolling national income of the two
territories forward in parallel, year on year to 1917.6 In each year of the overlap, the transition
5 Net national income per head from 1885 to 1913 in rubles and 1913 prices is from Gregory
(1980, pp. 56-57). Taking natural logs, with t ratios in brackets, and omitting 1913,
Ln(INCOME) = -28.48 (7.535) + 0.01738 (8.731) x YEAR; N = 28, R2 = 0.7457.
Predicted income per head in 1913 is then 118 rubles 5 kopecks compared with measured 118
rubles 50 kopecks.
6 Underlying national income shares are taken from Appendix C, Table C-1. There is a
discrepancy of territorial coverage for the Russian Empire up to 1917. Annual time series of
wartime production of the Russian Empire by sector of origin are based on the Empire territory,
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from Russian to Soviet territory is found by subtracting activity on the lost territories (agriculture
and transport); or by interpolating the trend in one territory on the trend in the other (industry,
construction, and other civilian sectors); or by assuming a common trend and scaling from one
territory to the other on the basis of relative populations (military services). From 1918
Appendix C provides branch-level data and describes sources and methods, while Appendixes D
and E provide commodity-level data for agriculture and industry.
Chart 1 compares our aggregate figures for national income with previous estimates for
comparable years, setting both Russia and USSR to 100 percent in the base year (1913 or
thereabouts). Some previous estimates have provided relatively complete series for industry
and agriculture combined, and Chart 2 compares these with our estimates for these two sectors
alone.
Chart 1. Russian and Soviet real national income, 1913 to 1928: New and old estimates, per cent
of 1913
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Source: Tables 1 and 4 and Appendix A, Tables A-2 to A-4.
Table 5 compares output with population to find average incomes. While aggregate real
output was about 10 percent greater in 1928 than in 1913, average incomes did not fully
recover. The reason is that the total population increased by about 14 percent, within constant
excluding Finland and Poland. We weight them by national income shares based on the territory
excluding Finland only. Ideally we would deduct the contributions of the Polish provinces of the
Russian empire from these shares. The Polish provinces, with other western provinces of the
future independent states, formed the economically most developed region of the Russian
Empire, but the exact sectoral composition of Poland’s national income in 1913 is unknown.
Correction for this would leave our estimates effectively unchanged. As a cross-check, we
applied Soviet-territory production branch weights estimated for 1913 to the Russian Empire
production series. Annual pairs differed by not more than 0.15% in any year.
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boundaries and taking the period as a whole. As a result, Soviet national income per head in
1928 fell short of the prewar benchmark by around 3 percent. This finding confirms the shortfall
found independently by Gregory (1990) and reported in Table 1.
Chart 2. Real national income produced in industry and agriculture on Soviet interwar territory,
1913 to 1928: New and old estimates, per cent of 1913
25%
50%
100%
200%
1913 1918 1923 1928
Pe
rc
en
to
f1
91
3 M&H
Prokopovich (1918)
Groman (1927)
Varzar (1929)
Gosplan (1929)
TsUNKhU (1939)
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Chart 3. Real national income and consumption per head, 1913 to 1927/28: Soviet territory and
various measures in rubles and 1913 prices
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Chart 3 shows, in addition to national income (“goods and services”) per head, two other
measures of the average level of existence of Russian and Soviet citizens. “Goods and non-
military services” aims to capture the availability of resources for civilian use. In the spirit of
Higgs (2006), it would exclude defense from national income as an intermediate rather than
final use of resources. The military services excluded here are the labor services provided to
defense; ideally we would also subtract the value of capital services and material consumption
in the defense budget, but there are no measures on which we could base such a series. So this
series is only an upper bound on the measure we desire. As the chart makes clear, resources for
civilian use fell more rapidly than total output during the Great War, and again during the Civil
War; although the Red Army never achieved the absolute numbers of the Imperial Army, overall
resources were so shrunken by the low point of 1920 and 1921 that the proportional burden it
represented was as great or larger.
Finally, “Goods from agriculture” aims to capture the trend in food availability per head,
which fell to a catastrophically low level. The result was urban famine, then famine. The
February 1917 Revolution that brought down the Tsar was sparked by urban food shortages. In
October 1917 the Bolsheviks inherited a public and private distribution system in collapse (Carr
1952). Despite falling harvests, procurement brigades stripped the grain producing regions of
food (Malle 1985; Figes 1989). Those who stayed in the towns were forced into a “crisis mode of
consumption” (Hessler 2004, pp. 38-48). By the end of the war, money wages were apparently 4
percent of their prewar level in real terms (Il’iukhov 2010, p. 24), with workers surviving on
public and private inventories and barter.
Although average incomes were not fully restored in 1927/28, the composition of national
income by sector of origin was almost the same as it had been 1913. This is found by comparing
the first and last rows of Table 4. There were two important differences. One was the growth of
large-scale industry, mostly under public ownership, at the expense of small-scale industry
under mostly private ownership. Another was a decline in the share of military activities by
more than one half. From the standpoint of the civilian economy and consumption this was a
“peace dividend,” but one that caused military and political leaders huge anxiety given Soviet
Russia’s state of military encirclement– both real and imagined – in the late 1920s (Simonov
1996; Sokolov 2008). This concern became an important stimulus to Stalin’s Great Leap
Forward.
The year-on-year pattern of change in real national income per head is revealing in various
ways. As Chart 1 suggests, our results give Russia fuller credit for the military mobilization of
1914 through 1916 than previous estimates, and revise the pessimistic view of Russia’s Great
War that is well established in the literature (Sidorov 1973, Gatrell 2005). The economy held up
through 1915. By 1916 it was in decline, but was still less than 10 percent below the peacetime
benchmark of 1913.
By the same token, the economic decline through the Revolution and Civil War appears
sharper than in previous accounts. Comparing 1917 with 1913, output per head fell by one fifth
in four years. Over the two years that followed, from 1917 to 1919, output per head halved. On
Soviet territory the year-on-year decline (taken from Table 5) was as follows:
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1914 -4.5%
1915 2.9%
1916 -11.1%
1917 -12.1%
1918 -38.8%
1919 -13.7%
1920 0.3%
1921 -8.5%
Notably, output fell most precipitously before 1919 when the Red and White armies clashed
most fiercely. This suggests strongly that the confrontational policies of “war communism,” with
widespread nationalization of finance and industry, and rule by decree instead of market
incentives, caused greater disruption than the fighting. Moreover, as the fighting died away, the
economy stabilized at around 40 percent of prewar output but did not at first recover. By 1920,
with a command economy in place, the Bolsheviks were able to stabilize large-scale state
industry and return it to a path of modest growth. But agriculture continued to struggle,
because the policy of surplus confiscation under war communism gave peasants no reason to
produce food above subsistence (Litoshenko 2001). A deadly game ensued between the farmers
and the authorities over the true level of food reserves in the countryside.
A notable feature of our results is that the famine year of 1921 came after a run of
disastrous harvests. Ó Gráda (2007, pp. 7-9) has shown that famine is much more likely after
two consecutive harvest failures, when the countryside has exhausted its reserves. As Table 4
and chart 3 reveal, 1921 was the third and worst year in a series of catastrophic grain harvests.
Consistently with this, new research by Adamets (2003), suggests that the famine actually began
in the summer of 1920, and in some regions as early as 1919.
Postwar recovery began only in 1922, following the revolutionary government’s decision to
restore market relations and the private sector in small industry and urban-rural trade. The
“New Economic Policy” (NEP) was announced in March 1921 under crisis conditions of
accelerating hyperinflation and famine; recovery was marked only in the following year. The
main mechanism of recovery was the exploitation of spare capacity which, according to Davies
(1994, p. 345, footnote 15), continued until 1929/30. The year-on-year growth of Soviet GDP per
head up to 1927/28 was then as follows:
1922 16.1%
1922/23 15.3%
1923/24 26.6%
1924/25 24.9%
1925/26 12.3%
1926/27 4.1%
1927/28 5.2%
Strong at first, the recovery slowed rapidly to single-digit growth. In April 1929 when the
Bolsheviks officially endorsed the “optimal” variant of the first Five-Year Plan, average incomes
were just below the prewar level. In fact, Soviet GDP per head did not significantly exceed this
benchmark until 1934. The prewar benchmark is a intuitive focal point for comparison, but is it
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the right one? Inspired by Jánossy (1971), the comparative literature on trend growth, war, and
postwar catch-up (Crafts and Mills 1996; Crafts and Toniolo 1996; Harrison 1998) suggests that
productive potential does not stand still when war breaks out. From this point of view, the
prewar benchmark is an excessively low bar. By 1928, fifteen years had passed since the
outbreak of the Great War. If in the intervening period Russia’s potential GDP per head had
risen along its modest pre-1913 log-linear trend of 1.75 percent per year, then by the end of the
1920s the actual fell short of the potential by about one quarter.
While the period under scrutiny is all too short, our figures do not support the view that NEP
provided effective institutions and policies for long term Soviet economic development. Once
widely held, this view was updated recently by Allen (2003). Specifically, Allen argued that the
best development strategy for the Soviet economy in the 1930s would have been
industrialization under a soft budget constraint on industrial producers and without
collectivization of agriculture, i.e. the New Economic Policy as it was implemented in the late
1920s. This conclusion is hard for us to swallow. One reason is in our figures: agriculture
stagnated as the investment mobilization intensified, with significant aggregate effects that
showed up in the deceleration and failed restoration of average incomes. Another reason is that
Stalin was turning to violence against the peasantry at exactly this time, motivated by the need
to resolve the urban rural market disequilibrium brought about by the soft budget constraint on
industry.75. Russia in Comparison
In this section we aim to compare Russia’s economic experience of world war, civil war, and
recovery with that of other countries. Russia’s experience of the Great War up to 1917 was
neither better nor worse than that of most other European countries that entered the war.
Previous research has suggested that national success in wartime mobilization varied inversely
with the prewar level of economic development, controlling for contingent factors such as
distance from the war and the time to mobilize (Broadberry and Harrison 2005, 2008; Eloranta
and Harrison 2010). But this relationship is created with a limited sample, largely by contrasting
7 These views have long pedigrees. It was the rethinking of the Soviet “model” of economic
development in the 1960s and 1970s that did most to propagate favourable reevaluation of the
New Economic Policy; for a survey see Harrison (1980). The adverse impact of macroeconomic
disequilibrium on microeconomic incentives in the late 1920s, emphasized by Harrison (1980,
1990) and Johnson and Temin (1993), provides necessary context for new evidence on Bolshevik
decision making surveyed by Harrison (2008). Allen’s (2003) rethinking of the macroeconomics
of NEP appears inconsistent: in simulations he finds that a soft budget constraint on public-
sector industry added to Soviet welfare by raising aggregate employment and output (2003, pp.
167-171), while in narrating the history of the 1920s he accepts that macroeconomic imbalance
contributed to the demise of NEP (pp. 85-86). But excess aggregate demand in the
macroeconomy flowed from the soft budget constraint in the microeconomy. For related
reservations see also Davies (2004).
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the richer maritime powers with poorer continental economies. It is also sensitive to the
revision of individual data points.
Chart 4 plots changes in real GDP of ten Eurasian countries from 1913 to 1917 against their
prewar level of economic development, represented by GDP per head in 1913, and
incorporating revised data for Russia. In addition to Russia itself, we observe eight other
continental powers (Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, Finland, Hungary, Greece, and Turkey),
and one offshore power (the United Kingdom). There is a positive slope to the relationship, but
this slope relies on two observations, the richest country (the United Kingdom, the only offshore
power) and the third poorest (Greece). If these are excluded, the relationship is flat; the average
for the continental powers was a GDP decline of 23%, while Russia’s GDP declined by 20%.
Underlying this was a continental Eurasian pattern of wartime economic decline. The
pattern reflected a common story, based on the burden of subsistence agriculture (Broadberry
and Harrison 2005). Across the continent from Russia through Germany, Austria, Hungary, and
the Balkans to the Ottoman Empire, military mobilization deprived peasant farmers of men and
horses, which initiated a production decline. But the supply effect was secondary compared
with the market disruption caused by the mobilization of domestic industry; this squeezed the
availability of all those things for which peasants were willing to trade their food surpluses.
Peasants withdrew from the market, cutting flows of food from country to town to a trickle.
Interventions to ration food at low prices to urban consumers generally increased the market
disequilibrium that already existed.
Chart 4. Wartime mobilization: The GDPs of selected Eurasian countries in 1917, percent of 1913
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16
In Russia, town and country were drifting apart well before the revolutions of February and
October 1917. This drift led to urban food shortage in 1916/17 and so contributed to the
downfall of the old regime. But Russia was not alone in its experience of urban famine, and
Russia’s overall economic performance was no worse than that of other countries that
conformed to the continental pattern of decline. Other factors must be called upon to explain
why Russia took first place among the countries where the Great War ended in revolution.
The turn to political and social confrontation and civil war vastly magnified Russia’s
economic disintegration. In principle the causes and consequences of Russia’s Civil War may be
compared with those of other civil wars of the past two centuries. Quantitative studies using
cross-country data have been limited to the period after 1945 (Paul Collier and Hoeffler 2007;
Blattmann and Miguel 2010); they seem intrinsically unlikely to throw much light on the causes
of civil war in Russia in 1917. Russia shows two markers that have had predictive value for the
onset of civil war: a political constitution that restricted competition and participation, and
several years of declining output (Blattmann and Miguel 2010). But so did most other countries
in Central and Eastern Europe at that time; we will probably not be able to explain why Russia
was the first to descend into revolution and civil war without reference to historical factors that
were unique to that country and period.
In the same way the progress and outcome of Russia’s civil war have specific as well as
general features. Paul Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have suggested civil conflict may begin with
grievances, but selection into the ranks of the contending forces ensures that grievance gives
way quickly to greed as the force that drives conflict to a conclusion. We see the Russian conflict
sparked by grievance, then fuelled by greed, but with the difference that Bolshevik greed was
for totalitarian power to the extent that it was not already for careerism and corruption (Raleigh
2006, p. 154).
The consequences of Russia’s civil war were very severe in international comparison. In
Russia, output fell by more than one half; this is much more than the average effects found for
civil wars since 1945 (Blattmann and Miguel 2010). We look to earlier periods to find
devastation on the same scale. On the losing Confederate side of the American Civil War of 1861
to 1865, production fell by half and real wages collapsed to 11 percent of their prewar level
(Ransom 2001). What happened in the Russian Civil War was similar or worse. A difference was
that it happened to the winners, not the losers.
The economic outcomes of the Russian Civil War also appear to have been more severe than
those of civil war in Spain from 1936 to 1939. There, GDP fell by more than one quarter and
consumption by more than one third between 1935 and 1938 (Martín Aceña 2006). In addition
there was excess mortality of more than half a million up to 1942, or around 2 per cent of
Spain’s prewar population (Antonio Ortega and Silvestre 2006).
No production figures are available for China during its Civil War, fought intermittently from
1927 to 1949. As in the Russian case it is impossible to disentangle the premature deaths in the
Civil War from those of the World War, but the total up to 1945 exceeded 35 million (Tao 2010,
p. 13). In proportion to China’s prewar population, around 500 million in the early 1930s,
Russia’s losses were similar or worse.
17
Chart 5. Postwar recovery: The GDPs of selected Eurasian countries in 1928, percent of 1913
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Finally, we turn to recovery. Russia’s recovery from its Great War and Civil War is placed in
Eurasian context in Chart 5. This chart shows two principal moments in the pattern of postwar
performance. One group of countries is ranged along a downward sloping convergence frontier
from Greece on the left to the UK on the right. To the left, a second group of countries from
Yugoslavia to Romania, all relatively poor at the outset, and more or less badly performing over
the period, falls below the frontier.8 The Soviet economy is found in the midst of this group. This
confirms our pessimistic evaluation of Soviet economic performance under NEP.6. The Long Run
Chart 6 sets our new estimates in the context of established long run real growth series for
Russia and the Soviet Union from 1885 to 2006. It turns out that the Great War and Civil War
8 This argument might be formalized further. We regress the annual average growth rate of
GDP per head, 1913 to 1928, on the logarithm GDP per capita in 1913, a World War I dummy
and a Soviet Union dummy for all 43 countries for which data are available in the Maddison
dataset (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/). We get:
Rate191328 = 0.07** − 0.007**Ln(GDP/head1913)  − 0.009WW1 − 0.015***SU;
N = 43, R2 = 0.17
Table F-2 provides the dataset and results of other specifications. The coefficient on the Soviet
Union is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, i.e. the annual growth rate of
average Soviet incomes between 1913 and 1928 was 1.5% slower than it should have been,
conditional on the prewar GDP level and engagement in the war.
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induced the deepest crisis that Russia experienced in more than a century of modern economic
growth.
Chart 6. Russia and the Soviet Union: Real national income per head, percent of 1913
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Source: Appendix F, Table F-3. All figures are indexed to 1913.
Table 6 provides a more detailed comparison with other major shocks to Russia in its
troubled twentieth century. Taken together these comprise just about every disaster that can
befall modern societies, including foreign wars, internal wars, famines, and state collapses. In
the table we combine income and consumption measures with estimates of the accompanying
demographic losses. Few of the figures in the table will ever command a scholarly consensus in
precise terms, but they are broadly instructive. We briefly narrate the stories behind them.
Stalin’s Great Breakthrough refers to the events following the adoption of the first Five Year
Plan in April 1929. Consumption was repressed; capital was created in industry and labor and
food were moved out of agriculture. Since productivity in both sectors declined, there was at
first no gain in total output. The average figure for the consumption decline hides wide variation
between regions and especially within the countryside. The struggle to control food distribution
stripped the countryside of grains and spread famine through the Ukraine, the Volga region, the
North Caucasus and Kazakhstan. Famine in the early 1930s contributed 5.5 to 6.5 million
premature deaths.
Only in the mid-1930s did living standards begin to recover, peaking in 1937. Allen (2003)
has argued with some justice that traditional index number concepts employed, for example, by
Bergson (1961), somewhat understated the underlying welfare gain of up to 30 percent by 1937,
compared with 1928 to 1937. However, Allen’s own estimates for farm income in 1937 are
probably too high; they rely too heavily on inferences from production statistics, and make no
allowance for market disequilibrium (Davies 2004; Ellman 2004). And it should not be forgotten
that millions of citizens who ought to have been alive to enjoy the unexpectedly good harvest of
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1937 had starved to death in the interim. Presumably, their absence helped to lift the average
consumption of the survivors.
It is notable from Chart 6 that Soviet average real incomes reached an interwar peak around
1939. Let us compare this peak with an earlier one, not 1913 but 1904, the eve of the 1905
Revolution, when incomes were already almost at the level of 1913. Over the 35 years from
1904 to 1939, incomes rose by about 75 percent. But in most intervening years there was no net
growth at all. In fact, three quarters of the net growth that took place from peak to peak was
achieved in just five years, from 1933 to 1937. By that year, the Soviet economy had just about
struggled back to the pre-1913 trend.9 This suggests that all Stalin had brought about by World
War II was recovery from the 1905 Revolution, World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Civil
War, and his own policy of collectivization.
The central event of the decade from 1937 to 1947 was the Great Patriotic War of 1941 to
1945. Linked to it are preparations for war in the preceding years and a food crisis that followed
the end of the war. Under war preparations we include both large-scale rearmament and the
Great Terror, Stalin’s preemptive war against his potential internal enemies (Khlevniuk 1996)
that killed up to a million people in 1937/38. The war then added more than 26 million excess
deaths in combat, and from disease, famine, and repression on both sides of the front line. With
the German invasion, Soviet-controlled territory shrank, but Stalin’s policies successfully
managed the war economy. The loss of agricultural land and the intense mobilization of
resources into war production and military services put living standards into a deadly squeeze,
however. Coming on top of a prewar decline induced by rearmament pressures, consumption
per head fell by up to one half. At the end of the war, a regional food crisis struck the Ukraine,
southwestern Russia, and Soviet Moldavia and carried off more lives.
Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to economic and demographic upheaval for
post-Soviet Russia. The transition from socialism is the only crisis in which mass violence did not
take the lead. In fact, it was associated with economic losses on the scale of a major war, but
with only minor wars taking place. Official figures suggest that up to 1998 average incomes and
consumption fell by around two fifths. Such figures overstate the decline in welfare, however,
because they neglect the contemporaneous gain to consumers as the retail market evolved
from severe shortage to equilibrium; this gain may have been substantial (Irwin Collier 2005).
While economic aspects are debated, assessments of the demographic costs of transition
are extremely polarized. In Table 6 we give an upper and a lower limit. Our lower limit is
100,000 deaths arising from small-scale ethnic clashes and regional conflicts. Our upper limit
includes additional deaths among men of working age across Russia as a whole, particularly
from alcoholic-related causes, interpersonal violence, and other diseases (UNICEF 2000). The
causes of increased mortality are disputed. The upper limit attributes all mortality above that
predicted by the application of age-specific mortality rates of 1989 to transition. In support,
Stuckler, King, and McKee (2009) assign responsibility for the additional mortality burden to
mass privatization and the actual or expected unemployment that, they claim, it brought about.
9 For the pre-1913 trend, see footnote 2.
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To the contrary, Earle (2009), Brown and Gehlbach (2010) and Gerry, Mickiewicz, and Nikoloski
(2010) reject the attribution of mortality while Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2010) reject the
transmission from privatization to unemployment. In earlier work, Brainerd and Cutler (2005)
attributed up to a quarter of the increased mortality to the relative cheapening of alcohol over
the same period. More generally, male life expectancy in the Soviet Union was on a downward
trend from the 1960s until the last Soviet anti-alcohol campaign of the mid-1980s (Demoscope
2009). It is plausible that the mortality spike of the early 1990s consisted entirely of deaths that
were postponed by the campaign, and so were stored up and waiting to happen when the
campaign came to an end. These views of transitional mortality are uncompromisingly opposed
to each other, and cannot be averaged.
Table 6 confirms that the Great War and Civil War rank first among Russia’s economic
disasters of the last century. National income per head fell by more than three fifths from 1913
to 1921. We approximate the consumption loss by agricultural production per head, which fell
by more than one half. The overall burden of excess deaths was around 9 percent of the prewar
population. Normalized by the prewar population, the demographic burden fell not far short of
that of World War II. Hunger-related causes were the most important factor in excess mortality,
followed by fighting and terror in the Civil War. Mass emigration also took place.
If there is a general lesson from Table 6, it is the importance of the state in the history of
modern Russia. In the Great Breakthrough and the Great Patriotic War, the state remained
intact. Production was maintained in the midst of disasters that killed millions of people. In
particular the state retained its ability to transfer food from people of secondary status such as
peasants and forced laborers, who then died, to soldiers and industrial workers, who then lived.
In contrast the state failures of 1917 and 1991 were associated with huge losses of output as
well as of consumption and lives. In each case the scale of deaths depended heavily on the
presence of open violence; this is exemplified by the comparison of two transitions.
Since Vladimir Putin (2000), Russia’s political establishment appears to believe that the
answer for Russia is to shore up the “power vertical” of the state at all costs. In this view, no
outcome is worse than a failed state. Russia’s twentieth century shows that a failed state could
be associated with terrible suffering, but it also associates grim suffering with a state powerful
enough to starve and kill without restraint, with or without the intention to do so. Whether the
answer for Russia is confined to state consolidation, or includes building an economy that is
more deeply rooted in civil society and private enterprise and more resilient in the face of
political action, is another story.7. Conclusions
Our work fills the last remaining gap in the record of Russian and Soviet national income in the
twentieth century. This gap, starting in 1914 and finishing in 1928, is full of historic and
traumatic events: Russia’s Great War, the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, and postwar
reconstruction under the New Economic Policy, which set the stage for Stalin’s Great
Breakthrough to forced industrialization.
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In comparison with previous interpretations, our findings give a more favorable picture of
Russia’s economic mobilization for the Great War. Correspondingly, we show the economic
catastrophe of the Civil War in a harsher light. Our results confirm that by 1928 economic
recovery, measured by national income per head, was most likely still incomplete. We draw
negative inferences concerning both the quality of Soviet economic institutions and policies in
the 1920s and the economic achievements of the 1930s.
Wars and revolutions have the capacity to wreak havoc on modern societies. Nesting one
inside the other, Russia’s Great War and Civil War led to economic disaster and demographic
tragedy. The scale of losses can be measured against both Russian and global standards. In
Russian terms it was the worst economic disaster of the twentieth century. Only World War II
resulted in a greater loss of Russian lives. International comparisons also rank the Russian
experience of warfare between 1914 and 1921 highly in the damage done to life and living
standards.
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Tables
Table 1. Gregory's population and national income: Russia and USSR, 1913 and 1928
Russian
Empire
exc. Best Upper
Finland estimate limit
Population, million
1913 171
1928 … 154 154
Percent of 1913 … 110.2% 110.2%
NNP, million rubles at 1913 prices
1913 20266
1928 … 15600 17600
Percent of 1913 … 94.4% 106.5%
NNP/head, rubles
1913 118.5
1928 … 101.3 114.3
Percent of 1913 … 85.7% 96.6%
Sources:
Russia and Soviet Union, best estimate: Gregory (1982, p. 113).
Soviet Union, upper limit: Gregory (1990, p. 337).
Soviet Union,
interwar borders
16520
139.7
118.3
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Table 2. From Russia to the USSR: Territories and Populations of January 1, 1913
Area in Official Less Corrected
square popula- double popula-
km tion counting tion
000 000 000 000
Russian Empire in 1913 borders 21800 174100 … …
Finland -326 -3197 … …
Empire exc. Finland 21474 170903 -9195 161708
Poland -113 -11961 … …
Empire exc. Finland and Poland 21361 158942 -8551 150391
Other territory lost*
Western -375 -20047 … …
Caucasus -22 -475 … …
USSR in 1922 borders 20964 138420 … …
Territory gained**
Central Asia 278 2259 … …
USSR in 1925 borders 21242 140679 -7447 133232
Sources:
Area: Figures in square versts given by IRI RAN (1995), pp. 11-15, converted at 1.0668 km per verst.
Population: As Tables B-1 and B-2.
Notes:
* West: The provinces of Bessarabia, Vilno, Vitebsk (33%), Volyn (50%), Grodno, Kovno, Kurliand, Lifliand, Minsk (33%), Podolsk,
Pskov (10%), Kholm, Estliand, and insigificant parts of Arkhangel and Petrograd. Caucasus: the provinces of Kars, Batumi (50%),
and insignificant parts of Erivan.
** Central Asia: Khiva and Bukhara.
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Table 3. Population of Russia and the USSR, 1913 to 1928
Official
figures
Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Apr. 1 July 1 Jan. 1 July 1
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
000 000 000 000 000 000
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 158942 150391 ... 152259 150391 152259
1914 162890 154127 ... 155188 154127 155188
1915 166658 156249 ... 156050 156249 150620
1916 169290 155851 ... 155329 144991 144469
1917 ... 154807 ... 154432 143948 143573
1918 ... 154057 ... ... ... ...
Soviet interwar territory
1913 ... 133232 134015 134798 ... ...
1914 ... 136363 137073 137783 ... ...
1915 ... 139203 139787 140371 ... ...
1916 ... 141539 142087 142634 ... ...
1917 ... 143729 143943 144157 ... ...
1918 ... 144585 144146 143707 ... ...
1919 ... 142829 142390 141950 ... ...
1920 ... 141072 140070 139068 ... ...
1921 ... 139068 138722 138376 ... ...
1922 ... 137684 137720 137756 ... ...
1923 ... 137827 138419 139012 ... ...
1924 ... 140196 140938 141680 ... ...
1925 ... 143163 143818 144472 ... ...
1926 ... 145781 146500 147219 ... ...
1927 ... 148656 149398 150139 ... ...
1928 ... 151622 152388 153155 ... ...
1929 ... 154687 ... ... ... ...
(Table 3 cont.) Sources:
A and B. Figures for 1913 to 1918, official and after adjustment, are from Tables B-1, column H, and B-2, columns H and K.
Figures for 1920 to 1928 are from Andreev, Darskii, and Khar'kova (1993, p. 119), using their high-mortality series for 1920
through 1922. For discussion and our own corrections, see Appendix B.
C and D. The July 1 figure, which we use for the calendar year average, is found as the average of the January 1 figures for
the current and following years. The April 1 figure, used for the economic year (October to September) average, is the average
of the January and July figures for the current year.
E and F. Figures are adjusted for territory held by the Imperial government.
Note:
In this and following tables, numbers that are interpolated or extrapolated are shown in italics.
Corrected for double-
counting, border changes
and migration
Territory under
government
control
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Table 4. Net national income of Russia and USSR: million rubles at 1913 market prices and percent
Agri- Large- Small- Con- Trans- Other Military Percent
culture scale scale struction port Civilian Services Total of 1913
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 8288 2793 1212 956 972 4263 243 18727 100.0%
1914 7643 2969 1188 971 1033 4138 410 18352 98.0%
1915 7795 3099 950 714 1243 4137 1095 19034 101.6%
1916 6709 2631 1069 557 1329 3686 1553 17535 93.6%
1917 6575 2046 950 400 776 3222 1362 15331 81.9%
1918 5128 876 891 137 ... ... ... ... ...
1919 4464 463 594 104 ... ... ... ... ...
Russian Empire (exc. Finland and Poland) under government control
1913 8288 2793 1212 956 972 4263 243 18727 100.0%
1914 7643 2969 1188 971 1033 4138 410 18352 98.0%
1915 7301 3099 950 714 1243 3989 1095 18392 98.2%
1916 6198 2631 1069 557 1329 3533 1553 16870 90.1%
1917 6054 2046 950 400 776 3065 1362 14653 78.2%
Soviet interwar territory
1913 7292 2408 981 878 833 3835 213 16439 100.0%
1914 6710 2560 962 891 859 3708 360 16050 97.6%
1915 6931 2671 769 655 1088 3750 961 16825 102.3%
1916 5723 2268 866 512 1198 3270 1363 15199 92.5%
1917 5838 1764 769 367 658 2908 1196 13500 82.1%
1918 4464 755 721 126 175 1932 62 8236 50.1%
1919 3878 399 481 96 222 1571 372 7019 42.7%
1920 3653 421 433 62 145 1459 724 6897 42.0%
1921 3282 384 481 60 178 1357 535 6277 38.2%
1922 3927 533 529 113 229 1650 273 7254 44.1%
1922/23 4527 746 577 178 298 1958 121 8406 51.1%
1923/24 5891 973 702 242 396 2539 97 10839 65.9%
1924/25 7236 1509 813 401 521 3243 97 13819 84.1%
1925/26 7613 2152 894 614 728 3715 97 15812 96.2%
1926/27 7756 2442 981 744 824 3945 97 16788 102.1%
1927/28 8079 2852 981 881 887 4234 97 18010 109.6%
Industry
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(Table 4 cont.) Sources:
For 1913, the starting point for national income and value added by sector of origin on both Russian and Soviet territory
is Table C-1, but the Empire territory here includes Poland, which we deduct from national income as a whole in proportion
to its population (Table 2) mulitplied by the relative income coefficient of 1.0852. We assume that Poland was at least as wealthy,
relative to the rest of the Empire, as all western provinces were, relative to the provinces that formed the Soviet Union. Comparing
the two territories shown in Table C-1, it is easily found that, in the western provinces of the empire in 1913, average incomes were
132.3 rubles, compared with 122.0 rubles on Soviet territory. Thus, average incomes of the western provinces exceeded those
on Soviet territory by a factor of 1.0852.
Value added by other civilian sectors (forestry, fishing and hunting, communications, trade, and other civilian services) in 1913
is found as the residual after value added by agriculture, large and small industry, construction, transport, and military services
is deducted from national income.
Figures for subsequent years are then interpolated on aggregate index numbers or other series as follows: agriculture, Table C-2
(total); large-scale industry, Table C-4 (total); small-scale industry, Table C-5 (column D); construction, Table C-7 (total); transport,
Table C-8 (rail and waterways, total); military services, Table C-11 (column D). An exception is the 1927/28 figure for small
industry, missing from the source; we assume that, in the deteriorating conditions of the late 1920s, small industry ceased to
grow.
For years after 1913, other civilian sectors are interpolated on the sum of agriculture, large and small industry, construction, and
transport.
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Table 5. Net national income of Russia and USSR: rubles per head in 1913 market prices
Goods Goods
Goods and non- Goods Goods and non- Goods
and military from agri- and military from agri-
services services culture services services culture
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 123.0 121.4 54.4 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1914 118.3 115.6 49.3 96.2% 95.2% 90.5%
1915 122.0 115.0 50.0 99.2% 94.7% 91.8%
1916 112.9 102.9 43.2 91.8% 84.8% 79.3%
1917 99.3 90.5 42.6 80.7% 74.5% 78.2%
Russian Empire territory (exc. Finland and Poland) under government control
1913 123.0 121.4 54.4 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1914 118.3 115.6 49.3 96.2% 95.2% 90.5%
1915 122.1 114.8 48.5 99.3% 94.6% 89.1%
1916 116.8 106.0 42.9 94.9% 87.3% 78.8%
1917 102.1 92.6 42.2 83.0% 76.3% 77.5%
Soviet interwar territory
1913 122.0 120.4 54.1 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1914 116.5 113.9 48.7 95.5% 94.6% 90.0%
1915 119.9 113.0 49.4 98.3% 93.9% 91.3%
1916 106.6 97.0 40.1 87.4% 80.6% 74.2%
1917 93.6 85.4 40.5 76.8% 70.9% 74.9%
1918 57.3 56.9 31.1 47.0% 47.2% 57.4%
1919 49.4 46.8 27.3 40.5% 38.9% 50.5%
1920 49.6 44.4 26.3 40.7% 36.9% 48.6%
1921 45.4 41.5 23.7 37.2% 34.5% 43.8%
1922 52.7 50.7 28.5 43.2% 42.1% 52.7%
1922/23 60.7 59.9 32.7 49.8% 49.7% 60.5%
1923/24 76.9 76.2 41.8 63.1% 63.3% 77.3%
1924/25 96.1 95.4 50.3 78.8% 79.3% 93.0%
1925/26 107.9 107.3 52.0 88.5% 89.1% 96.1%
1926/27 112.4 111.7 51.9 92.1% 92.8% 96.0%
1927/28 118.2 117.5 53.0 96.9% 97.7% 98.0%
Sources:
Population: for calendar years, the July 1 figure given in Table 2 and for economic years the April 1 figure.
National income: Table 4.
Income per head: national income, divided by population.
National income per head
Rubles Per cent of 1913
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Table 6. Russian and Soviet economic and demographic losses in four crises
Personal Per cent
Total con- of initial
national sumption popul-
income per head Years Million ation Years
Great War-Civil War -62% -56% (1913-21) 13.0 8.4% (1914-23)
Great Breakthrough 1% -14% (1930-32) 6.0 3.8% (1932-34)
Great Terror-Great Patriotic War -21% -44% (1937-42) 28.6 15.1% (1937-47)
Post-Soviet transition -38% -38% (1990-94) 0.1-3.8 0.1-2.6% (1991-98)
Sources:
Economic losses
1913-1921: Table 5 (national income per head at 1913 prices and, for the change in consumption, national income per head
from agriculture.
1930-1932: National income per head at 1990 "international" dollars is by Angus Maddison at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison.
Consumption per head is from Allen (2003, p. 147).
1937-1943: Total real GDP, percent of 1937, is given by Harrison (1996, p. 93) for government-controlled territory only, which
was enlarged by annexations in 1939/40 and then reduced (by much more) by invasion and occupation in 1941 and 1942.
Household consumption combines the decline estimated for 1937 to 1940 by Bergson (1961, p. 252 with that estimated for 1940
to 1943 by Harrison (1996, p. 104), both at 1937 prices. The wartime low point for household consumption was most likely 1942,
but we have no population figure for that year, so we use 1943 instead.
1990-1994: National income per head at 1990 "international" dollars is by Maddison at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison.
Consumption change is for "average money incomes" deflated by consumer prices in Goskomstat Rossii (1995, p. 77).
Demographic losses
1914-1923: For sources and methods, see the text and Table B-3.
1932-1934: The mid-point of the 5.5 to 6.5 million range given by Davies and Wheatcroft (2004, p. 401).
1937-1947: The official figure for excess war deaths in 1941 to 1945 is now 26.6 million (Andreev, Darskii, and Khar'kova 1990).
As Ellman and Maksudov (1994) it may (or more likely may not) include roughly 2.7 million wartime emigrants. To the 26.6 million
we add 950,000 as a lower limit on deaths in the Great Terror of 1937/38 (Ellman 2002, p. 1154), plus one million for the lower
limit on deaths from famine in 1946/47 Ellman (Ellman 2000a, p. 616).
1990-1998: Our lower limit is the 100,000 violent deaths in regional wars and ethnic conflicts, cited by Ellman (2000b). The upper
limit is found by adding 3.7 million excess deaths attributed to transitional reforms by UNICEF (2000, p. 51). The upper and lower
limits are based on entirely opposed assumptions and should not be averaged. For their relative merits see discussion in the text.
In this crisis, unlike others, Russia received substantial net immigration of more than 13 millions by the year 2000, including many
from the "near abroad" (UN 2002, p. 3).
Premature deaths, millionperiod, percent
Decline over
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Appendix A. National Income: Past Estimates*
The Russian literature starts from Prokopovich (1918a,b). His estimates of Russian Empire GDP
by sector of origin in 1913, based on changes in industry and agriculture over the war years,
shown in Table A-1, formed the starting point for all future scholars.
Soviet statisticians and economists were mainly interested in estimating the depth of the
wartime crisis and the rate of recovery from it. There were a number of attempts to produce
national income calculations for particular years. Litoshenko (1925, 1927) elaborated on
1922/23 and 1923/24 (Table A-2). He was the only one to work from “social tables,” aggregating
the personal incomes of socially defined sub-groups of the population deriving incomes from
the sphere of material production – industry, agriculture, construction, and intermediate
transport and distribution.
Other scholars worked on a sector-of-origin basis, as we do, but generally restricting their
scope to industry and agriculture alone. Thus, Gukhman (1928) produced an estimate for
1922/23 (Table A-3), based on the material production of industry and agriculture. The practice
of basing national income estimates for our period on industry and agriculture alone continued
through the Soviet period. Various Soviet-era estimates on this basis are shown side by side in
Table A-4.
There were also important sectoral investigations in the 1920s such as that of Vorob’ev
(1923) who contributed a study of large-scale industry during the Great War, based on the 1918
industrial census. Two others were suppressed at the time but survived to be published many
years later: a general index of large-scale industry over the forty years from 1887 to 1927 by
Kafengaus (1994) and a study of agriculture by Litoshenko (2001).
In the early years of Soviet rule, national accountants were actively engaged into data
gathering issues as well as into their analysis, running to many statistical volumes published by
the Soviet central statistical agency (TsSU) and the production branch ministries (VSNKh,
responsible for industry, and others). The TsSU, with its local branches, was the leading
organization responsible for data collection. Established in 1918, it combined two main lines of
pre-revolutionary statistics – the Central Statistical Committee attached to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, and the local zemstvo statistical agencies – into a unified hierarchy. In the early
years of Soviet rule the TsSU was a relatively independent organization dominated by pre-
revolutionary specialists; up to 1925, in particular, it was headed by a prominent zemstvo
statistician, P. I. Popov. Early Soviet statistical volumes described the data-gathering
methodologies and explicitly discussed data limitations where appropriate. Both Russian and
Western scholars view the official statistics of the 1920s, especially from the first half of the
decade, as of generally high quality (for more detail see Wheatcroft and Davies 1994a).
The emergence of Stalin’s dictatorship in 1929 reduced dramatically the number of
statistical publications and put a stop to independent studies on this theme. With one
* Not for publication.
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outstanding exception, Soviet specialists turned away from the problem of national income to
the mobilization of industry and labor (Sidorov 1973 illustrates this at its best).
The exception was Al’bert Vainshtein (1960, 1969), who resumed his work on the topic after
returning from more than twenty years in the Gulag and internal exile. Starting from Russia’s
national wealth in 1914, Vainshtein used his knowledge as an insider to explore the quality of
Russian Empire statistics and review previous attempts on Russian and Soviet national income.
He proposed adjustments for border changes from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union, and
offered corrections of the population and livestock figures. The population correction was
further investigated by later demographers such as Sifman (1977).
Reviving the subject after the Soviet collapse, Poletaev (1998) provided a systematic review
of this literature; Poletaev and Savel’eva (2001) compared two crises, one in the 1990s and the
other in the 1920s.
The Western literature starts again from Prokopovich (1931) who, exiled from Russia, made
his estimates available in English. Thereafter, western scholars have divided their attention
between the periods before and after 1917. As for the earlier period, the performance of the
Russian economy in World War I has been surveyed by Gatrell and Harrison (1993) and Gatrell
(2005). Table A-5 shows the latter’s revised estimate of the trend in Russia’s national income,
based on production in the material production sectors, through 1917. For the period after
1917, worthy of note is the estimate provided by Warren Nutter (1963) for three production
sectors in 1920 and 1928 relative to 1913 (Table A-6).
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Table A-1. Prokopovich's national income: Russia, 1914/15 to 1917/18, percent of 1913/14
Agri- National
culture Industry income
1914/15 100.5% 100.0% 100.0%
1915/16 98.3% 92.6% 96.5%
1916/17 90.7% 70.9% 84.5%
1917/18 93.2% 50.0% 80.0%
Source: Prokopovich (1918b, p. 173).
Table A-2. Litoshenko's national income (by social group): USSR, 1922/23 and 1923/24 in budget rubles
Manual
and non- Other
manual Basic Higher urban
Peasants workers rate rate citizens Total
1922/23
Thousands 111624 12050 3761 1202 4867 133504
Annual income in rubles:
Average 49.26 96.08 172.1 555 62.24 62
Total, mn 5498 1153 654 666 305 8276
1923/24
Thousands 113856 12484 3438 1274 5102 136154
Annual income in rubles:
Average 50.38 126.8 172.1 612 73.12 66.5
Total, mn 5736 1574 598 780 373 9061
Source: Litoshenko (1925, p. 47).
Taxpayers
Table A-3. Gukhman's net national income produced in industry and agriculture: USSR, 1913 and 1922/1923 in current
and 1913 rubles
Agri- Large-
culture scale Urban Rural Total Total Total
In 1913 prices:
1913 8620 2657 430 326 756 3413 12033
1922/23 6257 821 114 176 290 1111 7368
In current prices:
1922/23 4676 1100 148 232 380 1480 6156
Source: Gukhman (1928, p. 51).
Industry
Small-scale:
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Table A-4. Various Soviet estimates of national income produced in agriculture and industry (percent of 1913)
Groman Varzar Gosplan TsUNKhU TsSU
1927 1929 1929 1939 1957
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
1913 100 100 100 100 100
1914 96 91 99 ... ...
1915 103 89 102 ... ...
1916 103 82 103 ... ...
1917 83 72 85 76 75
1918 61 ... 71 ... ...
1919 52 ... 54 ... ...
1920 47 ... 49 40 40
1921 45 ... 47 38 38
1922 61 ... 44 ... 57
1923 73 ... 59 ... ...
1924 87 ... 67 ... ...
1925 102 ... 77 80 80
1926 ... ... 97 103 103
1927 ... ... 105 110 110
1928 ... ... 111 119 119
Sources:
A. Groman (1927, p. 47).
B, C , D, and E. Compiled by Poletaev (1998: unpublished appendix). TsUNKhu
(Central Administration for National Economic Accounts) was the acronym for
the Soviet official statistical agency from 1930 to 1940; before and after these
dates it was known as TsSU (Central Statistical Administration).
Table A-5. Gatrell's national income: Russia, 1914 to 1917, percent of 1913
Large Small Agri- Con- Weighted
scale scale culture Forestry Trade Transport struction total
1914 101% 98% 100% 79% 84% 73% 96% 95%
1915 111% 78% 110% 59% 68% 71% 100% 96%
1916 104% 88% 90% 31% 50% 43% 81% 80%
1917 76% 78% 87% 18% 37% 29% 68% 68%
Source: Gatrell (2005, p. 241).
Industry
Table A-6. Nutter's production indexes: USSR, 1920 and 1928, per cent of 1913
Agri-
culture Industry Transport
1920 64% 20% 22%
1928 118% 102% 106%
Source: Nutter (1963, p. 165).
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Appendix B. Population
Our population series falls into two subperiods, 1913 to 1918 and 1920 to 1928. For 1919, which
cannot be separately reconstructed, we interpolate between 1918 and 1920.
1913 to 1918
Table B-1 reports official figures for the population of the Russian Empire and its main
subregions from 1913 through 1916. Table B-2 reports our reconstruction of the figures and
their extrapolation through 1918.
Table B-2 is divided horizontally into two sections, showing the territories of the Russian
empire (excluding Poland and Finland) and the interwar Soviet Union respectively. In the upper
section official figures (column A, drawn from Table B-1), provide the starting point. Reading
across, the first adjustment (column D) is for internal migration.
The Imperial registration of births and deaths was of sufficiently high quality, but officials
failed to account correctly for rural-urban migration. They double counted migrants, once in the
place of origin and again at their destinations. A census could correct for this mistake, but the
only Empire census was conducted in 1897. The double counting accumulated each year from
that time. In column C we adjust the 1914 population for this error, following Sifman (1977)
who, starting from the 1897 population figure, accounts annually for fertility, mortality, and net
migration over the next two decades. Vainshtein (1960) previously reviewed various attempts to
estimate the true numbers. Sifman’s adjustment is close to the mid-point of the range of these
corrections. In contrast to Sifman, other authors rarely reported details of their correction
procedures. Volkov’s (1930) is the most transparent, but does not account for net external
migration and does not correct official figures of the population of the Empire’s periphery.
Prokopovich’s (1918a) downward adjustment is too large, because he applied it to the entire
country, including Siberia where there was no double-counting.
To estimate annual figures for 1913 and 1915 to 1918, we apply Boiarskii’s (1948) net
growth rate to the 1914 population figure and adjust for cumulative war losses and net
migration on the basis of Volkov (1930) (columns E, F and G respectively). Boiarskii calculated
the rate of natural increase for the Soviet interwar territory only; we assume that the two
territories followed the same path. Column J reports the results.
In working on this basis, we reject two other options. One would be to continue with the
official figures, corrected à la Sifman. Given the government’s wartime difficulties, including the
loss of some territories and the irregular information from the rest, the figures are just too
unreliable. Another option would be to use Volkov’s (1930) population estimates. But these rely
too heavily on the 1916 and 1917 agricultural censuses, which covered only the rural
population, requiring many assumptions and adjustments to arrive at the total population. So,
we reject this too. We do make use of Volkov’s data for migration and military losses, which
appear to be well founded. A separate argument for our methodology is that at least it is free of
rural-urban migration bias, since it accounts for wartime migration flows directly.
Table B-2 (columns K,L, and M) reports our estimations for the territory under direct control
of the tsarist government. Starting from the Empire territory, we subtract the population on the
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periphery occupied by the Central Powers, adding back the inward flow of refugees from these
territories.
The lower section of Table B-2 shows our adjustments to Soviet interwar territory. Again, we
start from the official Empire population of 1914. We first subtract official populations of the
territories of the future independent states (column B), summing figures for the provinces that
left the empire in whole (Note 1) and, weighted appropriately from Vainshtein (1960), in part
(Note 2). An “official” figure for the 1914 population within 1922 Soviet borders results (column
C).
We then repeat the correction for double counting (column D) and extrapolate for the
natural increase (column E). We estimate military deaths (column F) from the Empire figure,
excluding deaths of soldiers mobilized from the western provinces. Volkov (1930) put the share
of soldiers from the future Soviet territory at 81.4 percent of the total mobilized into the army,
and we apply the same share to all military deaths. For net migration (column G), we adjust the
number of Russian prisoners-of-war in the same proportion, then add the number of incoming
refugees from the western provinces based on Volkov (1930). Accounting for refugees changes
the sign of net migration from negative to positive.
We add the populations of Khiva and Bukhara (column H), which joined the Soviet Union in
1924 and 1925. Their combined populations in 1914 were about 2.3 million people (Davies et al.
1993), and we extrapolate this figure to subsequent years on the growth of the population in
the rest of the country.
The final result (column J) is the population on Soviet interwar territory from 1913 to 1918.
We are unable to go beyond 1918 because the data on migration in 1918 and 1919 are
substantially incomplete (Volkov 1930). The net migration in these years was large and negative
because many refugees and prisoners of the war left Soviet territory.
1920 to 1928
The Soviet 1926 population, based on the census conducted in December of that year, is the
most reliable figure in our data. It is free of the double-counting of rural-urban migrants in the
Imperial statistics. Demographers agree that this was one of the best Soviet censuses, requiring
little correction. Andreev, Darskii, and Khar’kova (1993) (hereinafter ADK) adjust it upward by
about 1 percent for the underreporting of Muslim females in Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia and
of infants.
We accept this revision, and we generally follow the ADK reconstruction of population for
1923 to 1928.
For 1920 through 1922, ADK offer three variants based on high, low, and medium mortality
rate in the famine of 1921/22. They express no preference between the three, noting that the
question awaited further investigation. We adopt their “high” mortality series on the basis of
Adamets (2003), who conducted a special study on mortality during the Civil War and famine.
Adamets did not reconstruct the population himself. He calculated a mortality index in two
variants: from available data for particular regions, and from mortality tables, simulated using
the age compositions of 1926 and 1910 respectively. His regional mortality index is supportive of
the “high” ADK mortality assumptions. His simulated mortality tables produce an even higher
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estimate of 17 million excess deaths between 1918 and 1922. But this relies on many fragile
assumptions, and we find it implausible.
We apply one correction to ADK ourselves. This concerns the figure for 1920, which we
inflate by 1.8 million. This corrects a misprint, originally in Maksudov (1989), which ADK cite as
their source on the White emigration. In his text (p. 185) Maksudov puts the White emigration
between 1920 and 1922 at two million but in the relevant table (p. 202) he reports the annual
figures (in millions) as 0.9, -1, and -0.1; the first figure is missing a minus sign. ADK reproduce
this misprint in their book (p. 14).
36
Table B-1. Official population of the Russian Empire, 1913 to 1916
European Steppe Russian
Russia and Empire, The
(51 pro- Central exc. Fin- Russian
vinces) Caucasus Siberia Asia Subtotal Poland Finland land Empire
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (J)
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
1913 125684 12513 9788 10957 158942 11961 170903 3197 174100
1914 128864 12922 10001 11104 162890 12248 175138 3241 178379
1915 131797 13229 10378 11254 166658 ... 3277 ...
1916 133552 13422 10558 11758 169290 ... 3315 ...
Sources:
1913: TsSK (1914, pp. 33-57).
1914: TsSK (1915, pp. 33-57)
1915: TsSK (1916, pp. 33-57).
1916: TsSK (1918, pp. 25-50).
Notes:
Column E is the sum of A to D; Column G is E plus F; J is G plus H.
The Russian Empire, exc. Finland and Poland
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Table B-2. Population adjustments and corrections, 1913 to 1918
Less Popul-
Cumul- regions ation
Empire ative Cumul- occupied under
exc. Extra- military ative net by Plus Imperial
Poland Territory USSR Less polated losses inflow Territory Present Central refugees govern-
and lost, in 1922 double from from from gained, popul- Powers from ment
Finland, 1918/22 borders counting Boiarskii Volkov Volkov 1924/25 ation in 1915 these control
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (J) (K) (L) (M)
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 158942 ... ... -8551 150391 ... ... ... 150391 ... ... ...
1914 162890 ... ... -8763 154127 -255 -166 ... 154127 ... ... ...
1915 ... ... ... ... 156670 -951 -981 ... 156249 ... ... 156249
1916 ... ... ... ... 157782 -1675 -1568 ... 155851 -11752 893 144991
1917 ... ... ... ... 158050 -1998 -1553 ... 154807 -11772 2413 145449
1918 ... ... ... ... 157608 ... ... ... 154057 -11739 2778 145096
Soviet interwar territory
1913 158942 -20522 138420 -7447 130973 ... ... 2259 133232 ... ... ...
1914 162890 -21204 141686 -7623 134063 -208 794 2300 136363 ... ... ...
1915 ... ... ... ... 136275 -774 2685 2342 139203 ... ... ...
1916 ... ... ... ... 137243 -1364 5188 2385 141539 ... ... ...
1917 ... ... ... ... 137476 -1626 6647 2429 143729 ... ... ...
1918 ... ... ... ... 137091 2473 144585 ... ... ...
Sources:
A. Table B-1, column E.
B. The sum of totals living in provinces that left the Empire in whole (from Note 1, below) or part (from Note 2).
C. The sum of A and B.
D. Column A (for the Russian Empire territory) or C (for Soviet interwar territory) is deflated by 5.38 percent to correct for prewar
double-counting on the authority of Sifman (1977), as described in the text
E. Figures for 1913 and 1914 are the same as in column A. Figures for 1915 onward are calculated by applying Boiarskii's (0000) net
reproduction rate to the population in the previous year.
F. Calculated from Volkov (1930, pp. 54-68) as the sum of military losses of all kinds.
G. Calculated from Volkov (1930, pp. 69-77) as the net inflow of migrants, refugees, and prisoners of war.
H. Khiva and Bukhara: Population of 1914 is from Vainshtein (1960, pp. 453) and for adjacent years is assumed to have been
growing at 1.83% annually, the average net reproduction rate in Turkestan for 1900-1913 (Volkov 1930, p.40)
J. The sum of E through H.
K. In 1915 the Central Powers occupied the provinces of Kurliand, Kovno, Vilnius, Grodno, Rovno (50%), Minsk (50%), and Kholm. Official
figures (as Table B-1) for the populations of these provinces in 1914 (as Table B-1) are extrapolated (as column E) through 1918.
L. War refugees from the occupied regions (as column G) added to the population under Imperial government control.
M. The sum of J through L.
Adjusted figures
Official figures
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Table B-2, note 1. Populations of provinces leaving the Russian Empire in whole
Bess- Kur- Lif- Est-
arabia Vilno Grodno Kovno liand liand Podolsk Kholm liand Kars Total
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
1913 2588 2020 2020 1842 783 1493 3955 1068 492 390 16652
1914 2657 2076 2048 1857 798 1744 4057 1088 507 396 17229
1915 2687 2083 2094 1871 812 1779 4128 1088 513 355 17409
1916 2699 2083 2094 1871 812 1795 4191 1088 517 410 17561
Table B-2, note 2. Populations of provinces leaving the Russian Empire, in part
Volyn Minsk Vitebsk Pskov Batumi Total
000 000 000 000 000 000
Population living within Empire borders:
1913 4071 2979 1896 1407 171 ...
1914 4189 3036 1953 1425 183 ...
1915 4242 3071 1985 1447 186 ...
1916 4253 3095 1995 1466 188 ...
Of which, living outside future Soviet borders:
Per cent 50% 33% 33% 10% 50% ...
1913 2035 983 626 141 86 3870
1914 2095 1002 645 143 92 3975
1915 2121 1013 655 145 93 4027
1916 2127 1021 658 147 94 4047
Sources:
Provincial populations: as Table B-1. To fill in observations missing from
some columns, numbers (shown in italics) are copied from higher rows.
Proportions living outside future Soviet borders are from Vainshtein (1960,
p. 455). Also left outside future Soviet borders were "insignificantly small"
numbers of the residents of the Petrograd, Arkhangelsk, and Erivan provinces.
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Table B-3. Population changes, 1914 to 1924: Soviet interwar territory
World
Popul- Crude War I
ation birth Estimated Estimated Normal military
Jan. 1 rate Option 1 Option 2 Births Deaths deaths deaths
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Annual figures
1914 136363 0.0437 0.0272 0.0272 5959 -3709 -3590 -208
1915 139203 0.0359 0.0288 0.0288 4997 -4009 -3665 -566
1916 141539 0.0271 0.0254 0.0254 3836 -3595 -3726 -590
1917 143729 0.0263 0.0291 0.0291 3780 -4183 -3784 -262
1918 144585 0.0347 0.0281 0.0302 5017 -4063 -3806 0
1919 142829 0.0317 0.0394 0.064 4528 -5627 -3760 0
1920 141072 0.0372 0.0484 0.0561 5248 -6828 -3714 0
1921 139068 0.0423 0.0448 0.0414 5883 -6230 -3661 0
1922 137684 0.0432 0.043 0.0471 5948 -5920 -3625 0
1923 137827 0.0505 0.0305 0.0287 6960 -4204 -3628 0
1924 140196 0.0472 0.0285 0.0224 6617 -3996 -3691 0
Balance over decade, Jan. 1, 1914, to Dec. 31, 1923:
Births 52156
Deaths -49994
Normal deaths -36958
Excess deaths -13037
World War I military deaths -1626
Other excess deaths -11411
Net migration (calculated as a residual) -1671
Sources:
A. Table 3, column B.
B. 1913-1919, Boiarskii (1948); 1920-1924, Andreev, Darskii, and Khar'kova (1991) mean fertility series.
C. 1913-1917, Boiarskii (1948); 1918-1919, Adamets (2003) regional mortality series; 1920-1924, Andreev, Darskii, and
Khar'kova (1991) high mortalityseries
D. 1913-1917, Boiarskii; 1918-1924, Adamets (2003) simulated morality series.
E. Col. A multiplied by col. B.
F. Col. A multiplied by col. C.
G. Col. A mulitplied by average mortality in 1914 and 1924 from cols C and D.
H. Volkov (1930, p. 54-68).
Crude death rate
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Appendix C. Production by Sector of Origin
Table C-1 is based on Malcolm Falkus’s (1968) estimate of the shares of the main sectors in the
net income of the Russian economy in 1913 within both Empire and Soviet borders. To reach his
findings Falkus began from Prokopovich but found many difficulties with the latter’s original
estimates. To correct them he relied extensively – correctly in our view – on Gukhman.
In Falkus’s work, national income was limited to material production. Material production
comprises commodity production, construction, and intermediate services such as transport and
trade. Final services are missing, and must be added for national income on a goods-and-
services basis.
The upper part of Table C-1 belongs to Falkus; in the lower part, we adjust from material
production to net national income by adding final services. For Russian Empire territory, we find
final services as the residual that is left when the net material product (18.5 billion rubles, found
by Falkus) is deducted from the net national product (20.3 billion rubles, found by Gregory). The
1.8 billion ruble gap amounts to 8.8 per cent of the Gregory total.
Within final services, we identify value added by military services as the cost of soldiers’
maintenance in 1913, marked up by 50 per cent as an arbitrary allowance for the contribution of
defense capital services. We deduct this from the final services residual to leave civilian final
services.
How reliable is our estimate of the importance of civilian final services in 1913? The two
aggregates that mainly form it were estimated independently, the net material product from the
output side, and the net national product from the expenditure side, so there is plenty of scope
for measurement error in determining the size of the gap between them. Employment data for
1913 provide a rough check. According to a Soviet handbook (TsSU 1973, p. 343), trade and
other civilian cervices (including medicine, science, culture, and state administration) accounted
for 14 per cent of total employment in 1913. Our equivalent is found in Table C-1 from the
shares of trade and final civilian services under Soviet territory, which sum to 16.3 per cent. The
fit is not exact, but it is close. A closer fit would not change our final results, moreover. This is
because we have no independent measure of the changing output of civilian final services over
time. Our only option is to allow it to follow the weighted average of the civilian series that are
measured. Changing its weight would make no difference.
As described in the table, we adjust final services to Soviet territory in proportion to the
adjustment of the net material product found by Falkus.
For subsequent years we estimate the real national income by sector of origin. Tables C-2, C-
4, and C-7 to C-11 summarize the production branch data that we use. Our figures for
agriculture (Table C-2) and large-scale industry (Table C-4) are based on series for agricultural
and industrial commodities production in physical units, found in Appendixes D and E
respectively.
Agriculture was the largest sector of the economy. It accounted for nearly half of all
economic activity in 1913 and 1928, and more than half of employment. Our figures are the
result of painstaking reconstruction of agricultural production, region by region and commodity
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by commodity, detailed in Appendix D. In Table C-3 we compare our index with alternative
Soviet-era index numbers collected by Poletaev (1998). Chart C-1 plots the aggregate indexes.
Chart C-1. Agricultural Production on Soviet Territory, 1913 to 1928: Alternative estimates, per
cent of 1913
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Source: M&H from Table C-2; other series from Table C-3.
For the mid and late 1920s, we come into agreement with the contemporaneous Gosplan
index. For the war period, especially for 1916 and 1918 to 1920, our estimates fall well below
the alternatives. It is difficult to identify the sources of disagreement because Soviet-era indexes
after the late 1920s were typically published without detailed methodological explanation. The
difference is most likely not in the original sources, set out and discussed in Appendix D, because
they and we use the same. Most likely, the gap arises from the correction factors that we apply
to the low-quality wartime data – particularly to grains. These are discussed in detail in
Appendix D, and Table D-1 provides a full list of those used in our estimates.
For industry, data are of better quality (Davies et. al. 1993). We start with large-scale
(“census”) production on Soviet territory. From Appendix E (Tables E-2 to E-13), we take 78
annual series of industrial products from Kafengaus (1994) and official figures for 1928 (TsSU
1929a). Of the 78 series, many of them incomplete, we actually make use of 60. For some of
these, as they are listed in the Appendix, units are not specified or are apparently misspecified in
the source. Our methodology for aggregating them is fortunately unit-free, and this saves some
data that we would otherwise be unable to exploit.
The industrial classification in use before the Revolution divided industry into 11 branches;
the only one on which we have no data, electricity production, was of minor importance at this
time. Within each branch, each product series enters with equal weight. At the branch level in
1913 we construct value-added weights from the 1918 industrial census, which includes
retrospective figures from 1913 onwards. A special study on the 1918 census (Drobizhev,
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Sokolov, and Ustinov 1975, p. 43) gave it high marks for quality and argued that its results could
be extrapolated to the whole country despite limited coverage (only 31 provinces). Applying
value-added weights to each branch index, we obtain an index for large-scale industry (Table C-
4).
Our methodology makes no allowance for quality changes within our period. Prokopovich
(1931) made the assumption that between 1913 and 1928 the average quality of Soviet
industrial products declined by about one fifth. Quality change cannot have been all one way;
the typical airplane of the late 1920s, for example, flew higher and faster for longer than before
the war, but we do not allow for this either. Despite such omissions, our index numbers fit
within the range proposed by Wheatcroft, Davies, and Cooper (1986, p. 267) based on deflated
nominal values of gross output for 1926/27 and 1927/28: 2-6 per cent and then 18-23 per cent
higher than in 1913.
We combine our index of large-scale industry with the only available measure of small-scale
production, a Soviet official index (Table C-5), using the associated 1913 weights of large and
small industry to aggregate them. The nature of small-scale production made accounting for
small industry very difficult, before and after the Revolution. One might argue that the Bolshevik
anti-market policy gave craftsmen additional incentives to conceal their activities from the state
after the Revolution, creating a problem of growing underreporting of small production. The
only available check, based on employment data, does not support this view, however. Davies
(1990, pp. 45-46) concluded: “The best estimate of the number of persons engaged in small-
scale industry in terms of full-time equivalents is … 2-2¼ millions in 1913 and 1½ millions or
more in 1926/27”: in other words, small industry employment in 1926/27 was most likely 66 to
75 percent of the 1913 level. The Soviet official measure puts small industry output in 1926/27
at 100 percent of 1913. Thus, it is unlikely that, by relying on the latter, we have understated the
contribution of small industry in the 1920s. Finally, the weight of small industry in total
industrial production is itself small (6.5 percent), so an error is unlikely to have noticeable
aggregate effects.
Again, we compare our figures with those of others. Tables C-5 and C-6 report a range of
alternatives, and Chart C-2 plots the aggregate index numbers.
For construction (Table C-7) we rely on the production of building materials (cement, red
bricks, window glass, and sawn timber). Effectively, we assume that the production of these
materials equaled their intermediate consumption in the construction industry, and that the
construction industry’s ratio of intermediate consumption to value added remained unchanged
over the period. A test of this approach would be to estimate the employment trend in this
sector and compare it to that of measured output. The main difficulty is that employment in the
construction sector is, in the words of Davies (1990, p. 46), “extremely uncertain territory.” The
problem lies in coming up with a figure for 1913, which requires extrapolation from the 1897
census. Davies concluded: “It seems likely that the right comparison is … between Gukhman’s
965,000 for 1913 and the census figure of 542,000 in December 1926,” i.e. a decline by 44
percent. Our production series suggest a smaller output decline, by 15 percent up to 1926/27
year. There is a gap, but it is favorable to the performance of the Soviet economy. Moreover,
the gap is not large, given the heroic guesswork underlying Gukhman’s figure for 1913.
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Chart C-2. Industrial Production on Soviet Territory, 1913 to 1928: Alternative estimates, per cent
of 1913
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Source: M&H from Table 4; other series from Table C-6.
Turning to transport (Table C-8), railways are relatively well served by official statistics. We
use the dataset assembled by John Westwood (1994) in ton- and passenger-kilometers for both
Empire and Soviet territory. Westwood also provides data on waterway freight traffic for widely
separated benchmark years; since this element is too large to be omitted, we interpolate
missing observations as best we can. Highway traffic was surely important too, but was almost
entirely unmeasured. We have data only for mechanical road traffic which, although growing
rapidly, remained insignificant in volume until after our period.
The coverage of trade and civilian services (Tables C-9 and C-10) is limited to employment in
1920 and the postwar years. Even employment series are lacking for the pre-Soviet period. We
report these figures but we are unable to use them.
We measure military services by employment. Table C-11 shows two series for defense
employment; Series A is that provided by the authoritative Correlates of War international
historical database, but we believe Series B improves on this significantly from Russian sources.
This uses figures on the number of solders from 1913 to 1921 for several months of each year
from Golovin (1931, reprinted 2001) and Direktivy (1978). We infer annual averages from the
monthly data. For later years we use official Soviet annual averages. The great expansion of the
Russian army and navy in 1914 to 1916 is the most notable feature of Table C-11. Even at its
1920 peak, the Red Army was less than half the maximum size of the Imperial army.
It is necessary, but not easy, to account for military services of the anti-Bolshevik forces in
1918 to 1920. The sizes of the White armies are known approximately. Volkov (2002) reports
figures for various armies for irregular benchmark dates. According to him, there were almost
no White forces during the first half of 1918; by the end of the year the largest White army in
1918, that of Kolchak, had about 50 thousand soldiers. The Kolchak army peaked at 436
44
thousand in June 1919, and the Denikin army stood at about 250 thousand in July 1919. But
their month-on-month variation was also large, by 25 to 80 thousand for the Kolchak forces and
30 to 82 thousand for the Denikin army. On the basis of these numbers we also make a token
allowance for national insurgent forces in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
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Table C-1. National income by sector of origin, 1913: Russian and Soviet borders and million rubles
Million Million
Rubles Percent Rubles Percent
Agriculture 8969.5 44.3% 7291.6 44.4%
Forestry 1067.0 5.3% 812.0 4.9%
Fishing and hunting 257.9 1.3% 244.2 1.5%
Industry, large 3022.6 14.9% 2407.5 14.6%
Industry, small 1311.1 6.5% 981.0 6.0%
Construction 1035.0 5.1% 878.0 5.3%
Transport 1051.9 5.2% 832.7 5.1%
Communications 120.9 0.6% 97.3 0.6%
Trade 1639.7 8.1% 1442.3 8.8%
Net material product 18475.6 91.2% 14986.6 91.2%
Final services 1790.4 8.8% 1452.3 8.8%
Of which:
Civilian services 1527.9 7.5% 1239.4 7.5%
Military services 262.5 1.3% 212.9 1.3%
Net national income 20266 100% 16439 100%
Corrected mid-year population, mn 163.7 ... 134.8 ...
National income per head, rubles 123.8 ... 122.0 ...
Source: Rows down to "Net material product" are from Falkus (1968, p. 55).
Other rows:
Russian Empire territory: Final services are calculated as the residual when the net
material product is deducted from net national income. Military services are soldiers'
maintenance, 175 million rubles in 1913, from Gregory (1982, p. 247), marked up 50 per
cent to account for the contribution of defense capital services. Final services, less
military services, gives final civilian services.
Soviet territory: final services, civilian and military, are adjusted from Russian Empire
territory in the same proportion as the net material product. Net national income is then
the sum of the net material product and final services.
Populations of January 1, corrected for double counting are from Table 2, adjusted to
mid-year as Table 3.
National income per head is national income divided by corrected mid-year population.
Russian Empire
exc. Finland Soviet teritory
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Table C-2. Agriculture, 1913 to 1928: percent of 1913
Sheep and
Grains Potatoes Horses Cattle goats Pigs Flax Cotton Total
Tons Tons Head Head Head Head Tons Tons % of
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1913
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
Weight: 48.3% 15.6% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 4.0% 4.0% 100.0%
1913 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
1914 83% 105% 104% 102% 98% 106% 67% 110% 92.2%
1915 94% 89% 98% 97% 102% 92% 59% 128% 94.1%
1916 80% 59% 92% 88% 116% 80% 58% 107% 80.9%
1917 82% 80% 82% 77% 92% 78% 53% 57% 79.3%
1918 54% 71% 79% 69% 81% 61% 49% 60% 61.9%
1919 45% 74% 76% 62% 70% 45% 37% 31% 53.9%
Russian Empire territory (exc. Finland and Poland) under government control
1913 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
1914 83% 105% 104% 102% 98% 106% 67% 110% 92.2%
1915 87% 82% 95% 93% 100% 83% 55% 128% 88.1%
1916 72% 50% 91% 86% 114% 76% 55% 107% 74.8%
1917 74% 75% 76% 72% 85% 72% 43% 57% 73.0%
Soviet interwar territory
Weight: 50.3% 12.9% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 4.2% 4.2% 100.0%
1913 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
1914 83% 106% 104% 100% 98% 107% 67% 120% 92.0%
1915 93% 95% 99% 97% 103% 90% 57% 140% 95.0%
1916 79% 55% 88% 82% 82% 95% 58% 114% 78.5%
1917 81% 85% 79% 77% 87% 86% 58% 61% 80.1%
1918 53% 79% 76% 69% 77% 68% 40% 51% 61.2%
1919 44% 83% 74% 62% 67% 50% 30% 27% 53.2%
1920 38% 81% 71% 64% 50% 72% 28% 20% 50.1%
1921 31% 83% 65% 60% 49% 61% 31% 15% 45.0%
1922 53% 89% 53% 54% 39% 37% 34% 31% 53.9%
1923 52% 129% 56% 63% 56% 44% 33% 60% 62.1%
1924 58% 141% 70% 94% 97% 94% 46% 148% 80.8%
1925 82% 151% 74% 99% 113% 92% 40% 242% 99.2%
1926 86% 168% 81% 105% 120% 89% 34% 240% 104.4%
1927 81% 161% 86% 108% 130% 110% 31% 308% 106.4%
1928 80% 156% 90% 110% 135% 123% 39% 382% 110.8%
Sources:
For quantities see Appendix D, Table D-2.
Weights in agricultural gross value of output at 1913 prices are taken from Gukhman (1925, pp. 130-135). Value-
added weights, available from Vainshtein (1960) only for 1910 and for European Russia, do not differ greatly.
There are no figures for the cotton harvest from 1918 to 1923. Numbers are interpolated on the
weighted sum of other rows, adjusted for the marked difference of trend between benchmark years.
Industrial crops
Livestock
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Table C-3. Agriculture, 1913 to 1928, alternative estimates: Soviet territory, percent of 1913
Groman Gosplan Varzar
(1927) (1929) (1929)
Total Total Total Crops Grains Grains Meat
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1914 99 98 … … 82 … …
1915 103 101 … … 82 … …
1916 98 99 … … 70 … …
1917 93 92 88 81 68 71 105
1918 85 91 … … 68 65 102
1919 75 76 … … 68 66 100
1920 61 69 67 64 46 59 63
1921 52 64 60 55 38 47 80
1922 71 54 75 75 49 66 54
1923 76 74 86 84 61 74 63
1924 82 80 90 82 56 67 83
1925 97 84 112 107 80 95 93
1926 … 101 118 114 85 100 102
1927 … 107 121 113 … 95 110
1928 … 106 124 117 … 96 120
Source: Groman (1927, p. 47), Poletaev (1998, pp. 186-256).
TsSU (1987)TsSU (1960)
Table C-4. Large-scale industry by sector: Soviet territory, per cent of 1913
Food,
Stone drink, Flax and Paper
and Wood- Chemi- and nar- Leather Cotton Woolen hemp and
glass Mining MBMW working cals cotics and fur textiles textiles textiles printing Total
Number of series:
3 15 7 1 16 10 2 2 2 1 1 60
Weight: 3.9% 29.9% 13.2% 2.7% 6.2% 21.5% 1.4% 13.1% 3.1% 1.9% 3.2% 100.0%
1913 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
1914 107% 93% 144% 85% 106% 111% 108% 100% 98% 125% 89% 106.3%
1915 78% 80% 216% 64% 105% 110% 99% 110% 101% 132% 75% 110.9%
1916 61% 82% 141% 49% 111% 83% 111% 110% 97% 115% 51% 94.2%
1917 40% 60% 146% 47% 85% 64% 93% 63% 70% 80% 29% 73.3%
1918 11% 23% 31% 23% 29% 39% 69% 41% 54% 42% 12% 31.4%
1919 5% 18% 18% 17% 18% 21% 35% 6% 21% 23% 6% 16.6%
1920 5% 17% 22% 12% 18% 26% 21% 5% 17% 25% 5% 17.5%
1921 4% 28% 7% 14% 24% 12% 37% 6% 12% 12% 4% 16.0%
1922 9% 25% 17% 26% 23% 21% 57% 20% 27% 50% 8% 22.1%
1922/23 14% 29% 31% 39% 42% 31% 86% 27% 35% 55% 25% 31.0%
1923/24 21% 39% 32% 47% 55% 40% 159% 36% 41% 73% 33% 40.4%
1924/25 38% 51% 74% 69% 82% 58% 209% 66% 60% 89% 53% 62.7%
1925/26 65% 74% 120% 84% 119% 87% 205% 85% 72% 124% 69% 89.4%
1926/27 81% 89% 150% 95% 124% 88% 102% 99% 89% 126% 99% 101.4%
1927/28 99% 91% 153% 105% 174% 123% 314% 110% 109% 116% 93% 118.4%
Sources:
For quantities, see Appendix E, Tables E-2 to E-13.
Weights in industry gross value added at 1913 prices are from TsSU (1924b, p. 198).
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Table C-5. Industry gross value of output, 1913 to 1927/28, alternative estimates: Soviet Union, billion prewar rubles
Small-
scale
(A) (B) (C) (D)
1913 5.62 ... 6.39 2.04
1914 5.69 ... 6.43 2.00
1915 6.39 ... 7.06 1.60
1916 6.83 ... 7.42 1.80
1917 4.34 ... 4.78 1.60
1918 1.91 1.85 2.16 1.50
1919 1.45 0.96 0.95 1.00
1920 0.98 0.82 0.82 0.90
1921 1.49 1.17 1.08 1.00
1922 1.95 1.52 1.44 1.10
1922/23 2.54 2.17 2.13 1.20
1923/24 ... 2.59 2.59 1.46
1924/25 ... 4.14 3.96 1.69
1925/26 ... 6.02 5.72 1.86
1926/27 ... 6.89 6.72 2.04
1927/28 ... 8.43 ... ...
Sources:
A. Gukhman (1928, p. 114).
B. TsSU (1929a, pp. 302-311).
C and D. Akademii nauk (1960, p. 198), citing Planovoe khoziaistvo 1929, no. 5, p. 191.
Large-scale
Table C-6. Industry gross value of output, 1913 to 1927/28, alternative estimates: Soviet Union, 1913=100%
Gosplan TsUNKhU TsSU Maevskii Gosplan TsSU
(1929) (1939) (1957) (1957) (1929) (1964)
Prices 1926/27 1926/27 1926/27 1926/27 1913 1926/27 1913 1928
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1914 101 101 … 102 100 … 110 113
1915 110 114 … 118 103 … 107 109
1916 116 122 … 120 109 … 111 112
1917 75 63 63 85 76 71 92 92
1918 34 35 … … 43 … 40 43
1919 15 26 … … 23 … 24 21
1920 13 14 14 … 20 22 22 19
1921 17 20 21 … 25 31 24 21
1922 23 26 … … 30 41 34 34
1923 33 39 … … 40 … 43 43
1924 41 46 46 … 48 51 53 52
1925 62 76 75 … 67 73 73 75
1926 90 108 108 … 90 98 91 91
1927 105 124 122 … 104 111 101 98
1928 127 154 152 … 120 132 103 100
Source: Poletaev (1998, pp. 186-256).
Nutter (1962)
All industryLarge scale industry
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Table C-7. Construction materials: Soviet territory, per cent of 1913
Red Window Sawn
Cement bricks glas timber Total
1913 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
1914 119% 110% 93% 85% 101.5%
1915 93% 64% 77% 64% 74.6%
1916 88% 43% 53% 49% 58.3%
1917 58% 31% 30% 47% 41.8%
1918 6% 15% 13% 23% 14.3%
1919 ... 9% 7% 17% 10.9%
1920 2% 9% 5% 12% 7.1%
1921 4% 4% 4% 14% 6.9%
1922 10% 6% 10% 26% 12.9%
1922/23 15% 10% 18% 39% 20.3%
1923/24 24% 14% 24% 47% 27.5%
1924/25 48% 23% 43% 69% 45.7%
1925/26 88% 47% 61% 84% 69.9%
1926/27 108% 65% 70% 95% 84.7%
1927/28 126% 82% 88% 105% 100.3%
Source: Calculated from Tables E-2 and E-6. The total is the
unweighted mean of the component series in each year.
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Table C-8. Rail and water transport, 1913 to 1927/28: physical units
Pass- Convent- Water-
Freight engers ional* ways
Ton/km Person Ton/km Ton/km Ton/km % of
billion /km, bn billion billion billion 1913
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 76.8 29.7 106.5 ... ... 100.0%
1914 74.7 38.5 113.2 ... ... 106.3%
1915 83.0 53.2 136.2 ... ... 127.9%
1916 96.1 49.5 145.7 ... ... 136.8%
1917 63.0 22.0 85.0 ... ... 79.8%
Soviet interwar territory
1913 65.7 25.2 90.9 29.0 119.9 100.0%
1914 61.1 32.7 93.8 ... ... 103.2%
1915 73.6 45.2 118.8 ... ... 130.6%
1916 88.7 42.1 130.8 ... ... 143.8%
1917 61.1 18.7 79.8 15.0 94.8 79.0%
1918 13.8 8.2 22.0 3.3 25.2 21.0%
1919 17.5 10.4 27.9 4.2 32.0 26.7%
1920 11.4 6.7 18.1 2.7 20.8 17.4%
1921 14.0 8.3 22.3 3.3 25.6 21.3%
1922 18.0 10.6 28.6 4.3 32.9 27.4%
1922/23 23.5 13.9 37.4 5.6 43.0 35.8%
1923/24 33.7 15.4 49.1 8.0 57.1 47.6%
1924/25 47.4 19.0 66.4 8.6 75.0 62.5%
1925/26 68.9 23.4 92.3 12.5 104.8 87.4%
1926/27 81.7 22.1 103.8 14.8 118.6 98.9%
1927/28 88.2 23.6 111.8 16.0 127.8 106.6%
Note:
* Conventional ton/kilometres sum freight and passenger traffic, converting
one passenger/kilometre to one ton/kilometre of freight.
Sources:
Russian Empire: All figures are from Westwood (1990, pp. 305, 309) except 1916.
For 1916 we interpolate railway freight on the figure for Soviet territory, taking
into account the divergent trends of Russian and Soviet railway freight in 1917
relative to 1915. The figure for passenger transport is then interpolated on freight
transport, again adjusting for the different trends of freight and passenger
transport across adjacent years.
Soviet territory: Figures for 1913 in real terms from Westwood (1990, pp. 305,
309) are extrapolated through subsequent years as follows. For railway freight
we use index numbers from Poletaev (1998, unpublished appendix) that closely
match series reported by Westwood. For railway passenger transport we use
1913-based index numbers reported by Poletaev for 1922 through 1928; for
the intervening years, we interpolate up to 1917 on passenger transport in
the Russian Empire and, from 1918 to 1921, on freight transport, taking into
account the divergent trends of freigh and passenger transport from 1917 to
1922/23. We ignore the index number for passenger traffic in 1917 cited by
Poletaev which, translated into real terms, gives a figure for Soviet territory as
large as that for the entire Russian Empire. For water transport we have figures
in real terms only for 1913, 1917, 1923/24, and 1927/28. We interpolate missing
years on railway freight transport, again adjusting for the different trends across
benchmark years.
Rail andRailways
waterways,
total
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Table C-9. Trade, 1923/24 to 1927/28: Soviet Union, persons employed
Persons
000
1922/23 286
1923/24 279
1924/25 420
1925/26 532
1926/27 582
1927/28 599
Sources:
1922/23: Vovsi (1926, p. 8), from a census of 1923.
1923/24-1927/28: TsSU (1929a).
Table C-10. Civilian services, 1923/24 to 1927/28: Soviet Union, persons employed
Govern- Edu- Medical Commu- Domestic
Finance ment cation services nications service
000 000 000 000 000 000
1920 ... ... ... 111 ... ...
1921 ... ... ... 103 ... ...
1922 ... ... ... 117 ... ...
1922/23 31 923 421 179 92 0
1923/24 48 947 484 244 76 133
1924/25 66 1004 551 271 82 193
1925/26 82 1127 603 324 94 253
1926/27 85 1164 714 365 95 317
1927/28 86 1135 781 405 95 317
Sources:
1920-1923: Employment in medical services is based on TsSU (1927, pp. 104-5).
1922/23: Vovsi (1926, p. 9).
1923-1927: TsSU (1929a).
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Table C-11. Military services, 1913 to 1927/28: persons employed
Anti-
Bolshevik
forces Total
(A) (B) (C) (D)
000 000 000 000
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 1286 1423 … 1423
1914 1321 2405 … 2405
1915 5500 6425 … 6425
1916 10900 9108 … 9108
1917 9050 7992 … 7992
Soviet interwar territory
1913 … 1239 … 1239
1918 … 313 50 363
1919 1550 1867 300 2167
1920 3050 4139 75 4214
1921 5500 3113 … 3113
1922 3600 1590 … 1590
1922/23 2100 703 … 703
1923/24 562 562 … 562
1924/25 562 562 … 562
1925/26 562 562 … 562
1926/27 562 562 … 562
1927/28 562 562 … 562
Sources:
A. Correlates of War database, at www.correlatesofwar.org.
B. 1913-1917: Calculated from Golovin (2001, pp. 166, 186).
The figure given for Soviet territory in 1913 under column (B)
is notional, and represents the Russian Empire figure for the same
year adjusted in proportion to the official population figures for
the two territories shown in Table 2. Figures for 1918 to 1921 are
calculated from Direktivy (1978, pp. 15-227) and those for 1922
to 1927 are from TsSU (1929a).
C. An arbitrary allowance.
D. The sum of B and C.
Armed forces
of Russia and USSR
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Appendix D. Agriculture
Table D-1 reports the corrections we apply to the original agricultural data as published at the
time, and table D-2 presents our final corrected series.
The basic source for pre-revolutionary figures on Russian agriculture is an official summary
of Russian economic development during World War I (Narkomfin 1922). Figures for 1913 and
1914 cover the whole empire, but there are omissions for particular regions – mainly those that
were occupied by Germany – and for particular products in the later years.10 We interpolate
missing figures from trends in neighboring regions. To move from Imperial to Soviet territory,
we use regional information from this volume and from the Imperial yearbooks for 1913 and
1915. In moving to Soviet frontiers we added the cotton production of Khiva and Bukhara.
Livestock figures are of worse quality than the arable data. For 1916 there are no livestock
figures at all for the Asiatic part of the empire; the European part is represented by data for 48
out of 53 provinces. These omissions were interpolated using data on the regional distribution
of livestock across the Empire in previous years. We use the same regional information to
estimate figures for Soviet territory.
The agricultural data of lowest quality are those for 1918 and 1919. For grains, potatoes,
and flax fibers, figures exist only for particular districts of 34 Russian provinces. These report
average yields per unit of area in 1918 and 1919, and cropped areas in 1917 and 1919. For these
regions, cropped areas multiplied by yields give output (for 1918 we use the average of areas
cropped in 1917 and 1919). We extend the regional figures to the entire Empire and Soviet
territories on the basis of these districts’ share in national output figures of 1917.
For livestock, too, figures exist only for the same districts of the 34 regions. Because national
livestock figures in 1917 are not known, we have difficulty extending the regional figures to the
country as a whole. As an approximation, we use the average of the regional shares of grains,
potatoes, and flax fibers.
Territorial adjustments are not the only obstacle to comparability of agricultural statistics
before and after the Revolution. In addition, there was widespread underreporting. To
compensate for this, we apply various corrections to the pre-revolutionary statistics, as shown
in Table D-1. These, especially those applied to grains, are the most likely source of the
divergence between our own aggregate series and the estimates of the 1920s, mentioned in
Appendix C.
We start with grains, to which we apply two correction factors. Many contemporary
statisticians and economists believed that peasants tended to underreport yields and sown
areas, particularly before the Revolution. From the mid-1920s, Gosplan statisticians applied a
10 For 1915 there are no data on grain production for 6 out of 53 regions in the European
part of the Russian Empire, and 3 out of 24 regions in the Asiatic part. In 1916 we miss 5
European and 13 Asiatic regions, and in 1917 we miss 2 and 5. On potatoes in 1916 there are no
data for the Baltic region, Belorussia, the Middle Volga, South Steppe, and Steppe regions,
Turkestan, Transcaucasia, and Siberia and in 1917 for the Steppe region and Turkestan.
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1.19 correction factor to scale up the pre-revolutionary grain harvest retrospectively
(Wheatcroft and Davies 1994c). While the intrinsic validity of this correction is debatable, it
continues to be required for comparability between grain statistics gathered before and after
the Revolution. We apply it therefore to our series for 1913 to 1917.
In the early 1920s, however, Soviet statisticians applied a smaller correction factor, namely
10-12%. They applied this both to the pre-revolutionary grain statistics and to the contemporary
Soviet figures, in the belief that the pre-revolutionary problem of underreporting had been
carried over into the Soviet registration system. Thus, grain figures for 1918 and 1919 appeared
in the 1921 source that we use, already multiplied by 1.11 (not 1.19). For consistency with the
grain figures of the later 1920s, multiplied by 1.19 (not 1.11), therefore, we apply a further
adjustment factor of 1.072 (1.19 divided by 1.11). We do not adjust the 1920 figure because, at
the time it was published in 1924, Soviet statistics had already switched to a 1.19 correction.
The further problem of wartime underreporting deserves special mention. Under the policy
of compulsory grain requisitions from 1918 to 1920, peasants had stronger incentives to conceal
harvests than in peacetime. Contemporary statisticians were well aware of the issue and
introduced further corrections for it from the early 1920s. These corrections are already in our
data. The original TsSU (1921b) correction factor was 1.25, which was the product of multiplying
the 10-12 percent adjustment for peacetime underreporting, discussed above, and a further 10-
15 percent correction for wartime underreporting of yields.
Alternative views from the 1920s, reviewed by Kabanov (1988), suggested larger corrections
of wartime yields, in a range that varied up to 40 percent. In the early 1920s, TsSU did not
support such larger adjustments. At this time TsSU remained a relatively independent
organization, with highly qualified statisticians still in charge. In the late 1920s, however, higher
agricultural figures for 1918 and 1919 began to appear in official publications. It is likely that
these responded to political requirements of the time, rather than changes in expert
assessment. The official line blamed the grain procurement difficulties on the peasants’
concealment of harvests and hoarding of stocks, and applied the same logic to the grain figures
of 1918 and 1919.
To summarize, we reject the further upward correction of the figures published in the early
1920s as driven by ideology rather than scholarship. In fact, larger adjustments would imply the
concealment not only of yields but also of areas under crops. The latter is less likely because
cropped areas were more easily observable.
We apply further corrections to the potato harvests reported for the same years. At this
time official figures included only field-grown potatoes, omitting those grown on the side, in
“subsidiary” farming in both town and country. Wheatcroft and Davies (1994c) cite Gukhman’s
(1925) estimate of 1913 potato production for a correction factor of 1.283, which we use to
scale the figures up.
Finally, livestock-breeding accounted for almost one third of agricultural production in 1913.
The 1916 agricultural census revealed underreporting of livestock on a large scale. This was
brought to light by Vainshtein (1960); before his work, no corrections were made. We follow
him in multiplying livestock figures for 1913 to 1915 by factors of 1.198 for horses; 1.415 for
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cattle; and 1.896 for pigs. The correction factor we apply to sheep and goats (1.504) is the
arithmetic mean of the three Vainshtein correction factors for other livestock.
56
Table D-1. Correction factors for agriculture
Period Factor
Grains 1913-1917 1.19
Grains 1918-1919 1.072
Potatoes 1913-1919 1.283
Horses 1913-1919 1.199
Cattle 1913-1919 1.416
Pigs 1913-1919 1.897
Sheep and goats 1913-1919 1.504
Sources:
For discussion of the undereporting of agricultural production
in peacetime and wartime, see the text of this appendix.
Correction factors are applied to grains on the authority of
Wheatcroft (1990) and Wheatcroft and Davies (1994c); to potatoes
following Gukhman (1925), cited by Wheatcroft and Davies (1994c);
and to horses, cattle, and pigs following Vainshtein (1960). The
correction factor for sheep and goats is the arithmetic mean of the
three Vainshtein correction factors for other livestock.
57
Table D-2. Agriculture, 1913 to 1928: physical units
Sheep
and flax hemp flax hemp
Grains Potatoes Horses Cattle goats Pigs fibre fibre seed seed cotton
Tons Tons Head Head Head Head Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
Weights 51.0% 14.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 3.5% ... ... ... 3.5%
Russian Empire exc. Finland and Poland
1913 99176 32699 39099 69495 110034 25948 861 ... ... ... 199
1914 82155 34225 40606 70831 107821 27581 579 ... ... ... 218
1915 93212 28958 38344 67462 112540 23790 512 ... ... ... 255
1916 79406 19431 36100 61092 127281 20832 498 ... ... ... 212
1917 80912 26091 31978 53541 101166 20141 460 ... ... ... 113
1918 53437 23109 30911 48245 89312 15958 420 ... ... ... 120
1919 44654 24246 29844 42948 77459 11774 315 ... ... ... 62
Russian Empire territory (exc. Finland and Poland) under government control
1913 99176 32699 39099 69495 110034 25948 861 ... ... ... 199
1914 82155 34225 40606 70831 107821 27581 579 ... ... ... 218
1915 86002 26714 37299 64803 110398 21526 475 ... ... ... 255
1916 71413 16276 35458 59856 125797 19672 471 ... ... ... 212
1917 73873 24391 29724 49768 94036 18722 368 ... ... ... 113
Soviet interwar territory
1913 88934 25640 35638 61096 101526 20546 928 ... ... ... 233
1914 73428 27112 36969 61359 99209 22009 618 ... ... ... 279
1915 82919 24404 35207 59151 105047 18423 533 ... ... ... 326
1916 69920 14045 31506 49966 83176 19587 537 307 563 289 265
1917 72054 21752 28078 47012 88829 17685 539 ... ... ... 141
1918 46920 20291 27141 42361 78421 14011 369 ... ... ... 120
1919 39209 21289 26205 37711 68013 10338 277 ... ... ... 62
1920 34111 20863 25412 39101 51030 14830 263 257 ... ... 46
1921 27668 21343 23331 36818 49721 12491 286 216 ... ... 34
1922 46971 22889 18875 33031 40022 7637 319 291 279 257 72
1923 45895 33089 20035 38567 56745 9105 305 316 312 313 140
1924 51581 36237 24980 57690 98389 19254 430 321 303 268 346
1925 72657 38606 26440 60781 114502 18946 367 483 576 548 565
1926 76562 42969 28772 64074 121671 18249 315 431 536 529 559
1927 71719 41218 30727 66203 131768 22552 292 511 518 596 718
1928 71542 39904 32207 67124 137138 25367 365 489 563 534 891
Note:
All figures in the original sources cited below have been multiplied by the correction coefficients in Table D-1, for reasons
given in the text.
Livestock
Industrial crops
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(Table D-2 cont.) Sources:
Russian Empire territory exc. Finland and Poland:
1913-1917: Grains, potatoes, livestock, and cotton are from Narkomfin (1922). Grains are computed as the sum of winter and oats, barley,
spring rye and wheat, buckwheat, and millet. Original data for 1916 and 1917 do not cover the entire territory of the Empire because of the
occupation of western provinces and the failure of some interior provinces to report to the centre. Adjustments are based on the weights
of missing provinces in 1913-1915. Poods are converted-tons.
1917: livestock are from TsSU (1921b). Original data for 34 provinces are multiplied by a factor of 82/34 for the 82 provinces of the Empire.
An alternative correction would use population weights.
1918-1919: grains, potatoes, livestock, and cotton are from TsSU (1921b). Original data for 34 provinces are multiplied by a factor of 82/34
for Empire territory.
Soviet interwar territory:
1916: livestock are from TsSU (1924b, pp. 136-137).
1913-1917: grains and potatoes are calculated from Narkkomfin (1922).
1913-1916: livestock are calculated from Narkomfin (1922).
1913-1917: cotton is from Narkomfin (1922).
1917: livestock are from TsSU (1921b). Original data for 34 provinces are multiplied by a factor of 72/34 for the 72 provinces of the interwar
Soviet Union.
1918-1919: grains, potatoes, livestock, and cotton are from TsSU (1921b). Original data for 34 provinces are multiplied by a factor of 72/34
for Soviet interwar territory.
1918-1923: cotton is from Narodnoe khozyastvo za 70 let (1987).
1920-1921: grains, potatoes, livestock, and flax are from TsSU (1924b, pp. 131, 135).
1922: potatoes, livestock, and flax are from TsSU (1924b, pp. 131, 135).
1923: potatoes are from Gukhman (1925, p. 133).
1922-1923: grains are from TsSU (1924a, p. 83).
1924: grains, potatoes, flax, hemp, and cotton are from TsSU (1927, p. 119).
1924-1926: livestock are from TsSU (1927, p. 188).
1925-1928: grains, potatoes, flax, hemp, and cotton are from TsSU (1929b, pp. 221, 249-261).
1927-1928: livestock are from TsSU (1929b, p. 221).
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Appendix E. Large-Scale Industry*
Table E-1. Large-scale industry, 1913 to 1917: the Russian Empire, physical units
Open
Anth- hearth Rolled Solar Raw
Coal racite Oil Peat Pig iron steel steel Aircraft Gasoline oil Flour spirit
Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Units Tons Tons Tons Grams
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 million
1913 30631 4077 8876 1458 4186 4302 3560 280 29.2 77.0 1713 87101
1914 30288 4366 8896 1649 4062 4442 3625 535 25.0 69.9 1528 79972
1915 31212 3258 9197 1417 3667 4098 3249 1305 22.0 39.8 1520 93307
1916 32018 2150 9723 1360 3779 4252 3356 1870 ... ... 1659 83351
1917 28615 5189 8198 1163 3121 2549 ... 1897 ... ... 1761 ...
Sources: TsSU (1921a); Narkomfin (1922).
Table E-2. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Stone and glass, physical units
Red Window
Cement brick glass
Casks Units Tons
000 million
1913 9275 2143.6 403255
1914 10996 2353.6 374344
1915 8632 1374.2 310230
1916 8167 921.5 214011
1917 5425 674.1 121789
1918 578 314.5 53351
1919 42 188.8 28224
1920 222 189.7 18919
1921 397 94 17600
1922 888 129 41600
1922/23 1385 215.6 70858
1923/24 2250 303.5 98122
1924/25 4454 486.3 174563
1925/26 8144 1007.9 246078
1926/27 10056 1397.8 281788
1927/28 11661 1765 356200
Sources:
1917: TsSU (1927), pp. 244-247.
1918-1928: TsSU (1929a), pp. 302-311.
1913-1927/28: Kafengaus (1994/1930, pp. 354-551).
* Not for publication.
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Table E-3. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Mining, physical units
Coal and Anth- Iron Copper Manga- Sulphur Chrome HCl
lignite racite Lignite Oil Peat Coke ore ore nese pyrites ore Asbestos salts
Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons * Tons
million million million 000 million million million 000 million 000 000
1913 24.257 4.706 9.235 9235 1.724 ... 9.215 1117 1.254 66.2 25979 22490 1978
1914 26.813 5.137 9.132 9132 1.814 ... 6.539 999 0.906 131.3 9828 15905 1933
1915 26.443 5.037 9.305 9305 1.635 ... 5.269 838 0.537 158.8 7207 10172 2003
1916 28.935 5.511 9.880 9880 1.608 ... 6.635 762 0.472 364.5 4259 12171 2602
1917 26.232 4.997 8.725 8725 1.391 ... 4.955 607 0.382 206.3 13694 6274 1804
1918 10.894 2.075 3.842 3842 1.099 ... 0.772 135 0.065 ... 868 1360 1321
1919 7.805 1.487 4.614 4614 1.187 ... 0.183 64 0.056 ... 115 672 610
1920 7.186 1.369 3.831 3831 1.526 ... 0.164 4 0.097 ... 2965 1458 740
1921 7.002 1.528 ... 4001 2.027 ... 0.129 4 ... ... ... ... 983
1922 7.317 1.723 4.646 4912 2.137 ... 0.244 13 0.066 6.3 966 3391 743
1922/23 8.604 2.035 5.271 5271 2.376 ... 0.481 62 0.320 18.5 672 6028 1040
1923/24 12.659 2.530 6.069 6069 2.821 0.725 1.043 100 0.427 24.9 7273 8469 1207
1924/25 13.138 3.334 7.060 7060 2.680 1.356 2.083 178 0.573 46.0 30648 12318 1356
1925/26 20.180 5.351 8.323 8323 3.510 2.761 3.307 381 0.970 95.0 26667 18297 1587
1926/27 25.220 6.798 10.284 10284 4.813 3.415 4.804 541 0.840 167.4 18060 21056 2088
1927/28 26.439 8.074 ... 11509 5.040 ... 5.357 647 0.737 ... ... ... 2428
Source: As Table E-2.
Note: * Units not reported.
Table E-4. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Metallurgy, physical units
Sheet Rolled
Iron steel steel Copper Zinc Lead Silver Rails
Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons Tons
000 000 000 000 000
1913 4216 4247 3509 32.3 2948 1371 4.1 645
1914 4082 4400 3582 32.3 2408 1082 2.4 706
1915 3685 4106 3257 26.0 1884 819 2.0 561
1916 3798 4273 3372 23.6 1523 901 0.9 408
1917 3023 3080 2444 18.5 ... 41 ... 195
1918 516 402 357 4.0 ... ... ... 19
1919 113 199 179 ... ... ... ... 35
1920 115 162 147 ... 82 193 ... 21
1921 116 182 224 ... ... ... ... ...
1922 188 317 250 10.8 ... 328 0.4 6
1922/23 300 615 474 2.3 16 405 2.6 65
1923/24 680 993 690 2.8 508 643 2.8 93
1924/25 1292 1873 1390 7.6 1491 876 4.2 169
1925/26 2202 2911 2250 11.6 1867 1273 10.0 295
1926/27 2961 3592 2744 13.7 2266 1027 12.6 313
1927/28 3282 4104 3232 ... ... ... ... ...
Source: As Table E-2.
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Table E-5. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Machine building and metalworking, physical units
Winnow- Reapers Pass-
ers and and Steam enger Freight
Aircraft Tractors Ploughs Harrows Seeders Threshers sorters mowers engines wagons wagons
Units Units 000 Units Units Units Units Units Units Units Units
1913 280 1 667 ... 68300 110180 49000 111000 654 1031 13801
1914 535 0 ... ... ... ... ... ... 763 1223 20385
1915 1305 0 ... ... ... ... ... ... 917 886 23486
1916 1870 0 133 ... 13688 22000 ... 22200 600 502 16792
1917 1897 0 50 6500 ... 15200 3200 7600 420 298 12702
1918 255 0 13 100 ... 100 500 600 ... ... ...
1919 137 0 23 1000 ... 100 800 1000 ... ... ...
1920 166 0 89 2600 9900 1200 3300 2300 ... ... ...
1921 13 0 101 6200 5000 1700 2000 1700 ... ... ...
1922 44 0 159 15400 8500 19700 8800 19700 ... ... ...
1922/23 146 2 207 26800 10700 25900 11600 25900 ... ... ...
1923/24 208 10 174 125800 9700 13600 21300 13600 ... ... ...
1924/25 326 481 582 174500 29980 35600 57600 55800 ... ... ...
1925/26 469 813 945 310200 61995 54700 94800 88100 ... ... ...
1926/27 575 781 1037 355390 58065 66472 141974 170501 ... ... ...
1927/28 870 1332 1167 590028 55123 84025 194052 244895 ... ... ...
Source: As Table E-2.
Table E-6. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Woodworking, physical units
Sawn Ply-
timber wood
Cu. m Cu. m
million 000
1913 11875 24556
1914 10062 40459
1915 7657 42583
1916 5813 45905
1917 5578 54652
1918 2754 ...
1919 2008 ...
1920 1484 ...
1921 1710 ...
1922 3057 3330
1922/23 4584 22995
1923/24 5621 52600
1924/25 8165 84500
1925/26 9943 118000
1926/27 11322 137435
1927/28 12458 ...
Source: As Table E-2.
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Table E-7. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Chemicals, physical units
Conc.
House- Rubber Hydro- Sul- sul-
Caustic Baking hold foot- Sul- Nitric chloric phuric phuric
soda soda soap wear phates acid acid acid acid Paints
Tons Tons Boxes Pairs Tons * * * * *
000 000
1913 49338 159873 94892 27885 70649 9992 60737 132786 51142 3243
1914 52565 144378 96252 23164 41033 8665 42376 98414 43441 3964
1915 46291 117071 111273 23769 54973 16626 31582 156172 79773 1114
1916 49205 135647 111273 19695 49010 25390 39263 184980 73704 164
1917 40017 101307 87341 17402 30502 20197 39354 194693 85224 410
1918 7797 18984 63835 5856 14489 5602 21726 45197 24586 213
1919 1671 4056 7579 2616 3623 3178 4875 22403 17418 98
1920 ... 11212 11475 10 9999 1769 16734 16911 6952 49
1921 ... ... 8348 626 ... ... ... ... ... ...
1922 10631 32170 11603 8568 ... ... 17780 36491 6843 524
1922/23 19384 55120 20263 9971 15398 ... 23440 51848 12489 1605
1923/24 29550 78151 41197 6178 26176 ... 38380 84818 22146 1458
1924/25 35742 98447 74957 15731 23408 ... 35906 106064 23424 3800
1925/26 43621 136728 101690 25302 27912 ... 43310 147949 24047 8485
1926/27 51437 171445 129623 29631 29824 ... 46481 167705 32986 ...
1927/28 55734 209011 156097 36004 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source: As Table E-2.
Note: * Units not reported.
Table E-7 (continued).
Gaso- Lighting Solar Residual
line oil oil oils Matches
Tons Tons Tons Tons Boxes
000 000 000 000 000
1913 262.6 1553 144.1 4127 3753
1914 179.3 1366 111.6 4132 4092
1915 91.3 1153 76.1 5514 2940
1916 223.5 1164 112.9 3713 2900
1917 229.8 1223 147.8 3410 2280
1918 18.7 386 36.9 956 1019
1919 50.9 524 23.2 1643 1008
1920 36.2 396 103.8 1115 633
1921 67.0 532 32.0 2167 782
1922 83.0 565 39.0 2258 1031
1922/23 140.3 613 242.0 2190 1425
1923/24 223.4 789 275.1 2399 1883
1924/25 406.6 1132 355.1 2927 3162
1925/26 603.0 1324 521.6 3191 3955
1926/27 775.2 1740 482.5 3705 4250
1927/28 934.0 2047 655.0 4683 5554
Source: As Table E-2.
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Table E-8. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Food, beverages, and narcotics, physical units
Beet Candle Gly- Cigar- Makh- Raw
sugar Vinegar wax cerin ettes orka Butter Beer Starch Molasses Flour Groats spirit
Tons * * Tons Units Tons Tons Hectol. Tons Tons Tons Tons Hectol.
million trillion 000 million 000 000
1913 1794 7257 19100 4980 22.1 78676 ... 8064 123673 54154 4938 218631 11564
1914 2130 5242 16348 17707 25.7 84654 ... 5015 114357 110241 5496 243365 13443
1915 2578 6634 12482 15561 31.1 73304 ... 136 97418 111027 7305 321582 6028
1916 2354 3833 10467 16184 29.4 82330 ... ... 77578 93664 3888 172126 2005
1917 2030 1556 4292 2637 22.0 81564 ... ... 58495 66996 ... ... 476
1918 1166 770 2817 2850 12.7 28468 ... ... 13497 30304 ... ... ...
1919 394 442 ... ... 12.0 18722 ... ... 9370 17331 ... ... 60
1920 98 246 ... ... 4.8 21384 ... ... 5831 8354 2977 203348 309
1921 65 ... ... ... 5.1 11923 26754 ... ... ... ... ... 504
1922 241 ... 131 98 12.6 13252 55995 ... 35415 5209 ... ... 216
1922/23 248 410 573 442 10.8 19546 87652 989 ... 17593 2673 182266 280
1923/24 499 770 1491 704 13.0 30599 127506 2276 51861 ... 3524 180076 220
1924/25 753 983 3636 1769 26.3 46506 219320 2531 63702 20115 4231 277972 1004
1925/26 1507 1523 5111 3112 37.3 81458 327034 4084 99168 22277 5881 358499 4106
1926/27 1285 1770 4346 4310 40.7 82486 252922 4181 119320 26995 7060 250151 4726
1927/28 1637 ... ... ... 49.0 83815 335070 ... ... ... 6753 300000 5205
Source: As Table E-2.
Table E-9. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Leather and fur, physical units
Large Small Foot- Pig
hides hides wear bristle
Units Units Pairs Tons
000 000 000
1913 570 1203 8349 491
1914 1021 4872 9743 491
1915 1156 4353 8705 459
1916 1100 4919 9837 508
1917 1049 3587 7173 491
1918 3140 4764 4551 410
1919 2613 4517 3105 164
1920 2466 3665 2638 49
1921 3416 3274 3361 165
1922 3510 2856 3442 357
1922/23 4973 4676 4070 606
1923/24 6249 5379 4568 1294
1924/25 7385 9651 8200 1572
1925/26 8397 12521 10827 1376
1926/27 10163 13347 17035 ...
1927/28 11554 15643 26246 ...
Source: As Table E-2.
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Table E-10. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Cotton textiles, physical units
Un-
bleached
Yarn cloth
Tons Metres
000
1913 270770 250064
1914 270311 ...
1915 298207 ...
1916 297945 ...
1917 209638 120188
1918 118906 92992
1919 17986 15266
1920 13514 11984
1921 21819 10008
1922 71501 33118
1922/23 74394 65440
1923/24 101893 84196
1924/25 185050 157330
1925/26 240826 201857
1926/27 278101 237778
1927/28 316878 256836
Source: As Table E-2.
Table E-11. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Woollen textiles, physical units
Un-
bleached Finished
Yarn cloth fabric
Tons Metres Metres
000 000
1913 46455 45063 ...
1914 45521 44161 ...
1915 46815 45407 ...
1916 44244 44358 ...
1917 32450 31483 78602
1918 24948 24194 60417
1919 9943 9632 24068
1920 8045 7338 18340
1921 6790 4583 14305
1922 13745 10694 23402
1922/23 14564 17237 29946
1923/24 19306 17855 33853
1924/25 27665 27664 51823
1925/26 32943 32943 66796
1926/27 41100 40606 85209
1927/28 52383 47240 78575
Source: As Table E-2.
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Table E-12. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Silk textiles, physical units
Finished
fabrics
Metres
000
1913 ...
1914 ...
1915 ...
1916 ...
1917 ...
1918 ...
1919 604
1920 429
1921 663
1922 2245
1922/23 3542
1923/24 2161
1924/25 2212
1925/26 5588
1926/27 6468
1927/28 9776
Source: As Table E-2.
Table E-13. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Flax and hemp textiles, physical units
Finished
fabrics
Metres
000
1913 53253
1914 66751
1915 70076
1916 61198
1917 42360
1918 22605
1919 12367
1920 13104
1921 6605
1922 26678
1922/23 29402
1923/24 39038
1924/25 47536
1925/26 66003
1926/27 66860
1927/28 61979
Source: As Table E-2.
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Table E-14. Large-scale industry on Soviet territory, 1913 to 1927/28: Paper and printing, physical units
Cartons
Tons
1913 38216
1914 34055
1915 28764
1916 19657
1917 11188
1918 4714
1919 2277
1920 1854
1921 1553
1922 2935
1922/23 9422
1923/24 12427
1924/25 20168
1925/26 26536
1926/27 37772
1927/28 35460
Source: As Table E-2.
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Appendix F. Comparative and Long-Run Data*
Table F-1. GDP in 1913, 1917, and 1928: selected European countries in international dollars at 1990 prices and per cent
GDP per
head, $
1913 1917 1928
United Kingdom 4921 113% 109%
Belgium 4220 84% 127%
Germany 3648 76% 111%
France 3485 79% 126%
Austria 3465 67% 104%
Finland 2111 77% 144%
Hungary 2098 75% 125%
Czechoslovakia 2096 … 148%
Romania 1741 … 77%
Greece 1592 55% 161%
Bulgaria 1534 … 99%
Russia 1488 80% 110%
Turkey 1213 75% 85%
Yugoslavia 1057 … 128%
Source:
All figures are from or based on estimates by Angus Maddison at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/,
except as follows: UK (1917) from Broadberry and Howlett (2005, p. 208); Germany (1917) from Ritschl
(2005, p. 45, midpoint of columns VI and VII); France (1917) from Hautcoeur (2005, p. 171); Austria
and Hungary (1917) from Schulze (2005, p. 83); USSR (1917 and 1928) from Table 8; Turkey (1917) is
based on the statement by Pamuk (2005, p. 120) that "by 1918 the GDP of the empire had declined
had declined by at least 30 per cent, and perhaps 40 per cent or more, from its prewar level."
cent of 1913
GDP, total, per
* Not for publication.
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Table F-2. Ln GDP per capita in 1913 and average annual GDP per capita growth in 1913 to 1928: selected countries
Annual Natural Annual Natural
average log of average log of
growth of GDP per growth of GDP per
GDP per head in Great GDP per head in Great
head 1913 and War head 1913 and War
1913-1928 1990 GK$ dummy 1913-1928 1990 GK$ dummy
United Kingdom 0.57% 8.50127 1 Spain 1.52% 7.62852 0
Belgium 1.31% 8.34759 1 Australia 0.37% 8.54811 1
Germany 0.76% 8.20194 1 New Zealand -0.01% 8.54714 1
France 1.60% 8.15622 1 Canada 1.01% 8.39999 1
Austria 0.36% 8.15047 1 United States 1.43% 8.57565 1
Finland 1.66% 7.65492 1 Argentina 0.82% 8.24197 0
Hungary 0.94% 7.64874 1 Brazil 2.37% 6.69827 1
Czechoslovakia 2.34% 7.64779 1 Chile 0.73% 8.00236 0
Romania -2.34% 7.46222 1 Colombia 1.25% 7.11964 0
Greece 2.26% 7.37275 1 Mexico 0.46% 7.45703 0
Bulgaria -1.53% 7.33563 1 Peru 3.54% 6.93925 1
Russia -0.24% 7.30519 1 Uruguay 1.10% 8.10470 1
Turkey -0.88% 7.10085 1 Venezuela 6.79% 7.00670 0
Yugoslavia 1.45% 6.96319 1 India 0.32% 6.51175 1
Denmark 1.34% 8.27180 0 Indonesia and Timor 1.71% 6.77308 0
Italy 1.08% 7.84932 1 Japan 2.41% 7.23490 1
Netherlands 2.30% 8.30623 0 Philippines 2.29% 6.89568 1
Norway 1.59% 7.80262 0 South Korea 2.10% 6.76734 1
Sweden 1.56% 8.03041 0 Taiwan 2.72% 6.59578 1
Switzerland 2.46% 8.35843 0 Malaysia 2.89% 6.80240 1
Ireland 0.00% 7.91425 1 Sri Lanka 0.12% 7.11802 1
Portugal 1.08% 7.13090 1
Source:
Rows from the UK to Yugoslavia as Table F-1; all other GDP figures are from
or based on estimates by Angus Maddison at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.
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Table F-2, note 1. Regression results
Dependent variable is GDP per head growth, 1913 to 1928 in natural logs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ln GDP per capita in 1913 -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.007** -0.004* -0.005** -0.005* -0.005*
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
World War I dummy -0.009* -0.009 -0.004 -0.004
0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003
Soviet Union dummy -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015***
0.003 .003 0.002 0.002
Constant 0.054** 0.068** .057** 0.07** 0.045** 0.053*** 0.049** 0.055***
0.024 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.019
Excluding outliers No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Venezuela and India)
R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.17 0 .05 0 .08 0 .10 0 .12
N 43 43 43 43 41 41 41 41
Note: robust starndard errors are reported
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Table F-3. Real national income per head in the former Russian Empire and USSR, 1885 to 2006
Maddison, Maddison,
inter- inter-
Gregory, M&H, national Harrison, Gregory, M&H, national Harrison,
rubles of rubles of dollars rubles of rubles of rubles of dollars rubles of
1913 1913 of 1990 1937 1913 1913 of 1990 1937
1885 72.5 ... ... 1915 ... 119.9 ... ...
1886 69.7 ... ... ... 1916 ... 106.6 ... ...
1887 81.5 ... ... ... 1917 ... 93.6 ... ...
1888 78.4 ... ... ... 1918 ... 57.3 ... ...
1889 72.9 ... ... ... 1919 ... 49.4 ... ...
1890 72.6 ... ... ... 1920 ... 49.6 ... ...
1891 66.5 ... ... ... 1921 ... 45.4 ... ...
1892 72.8 ... ... ... 1922 ... 52.7 ... ...
1893 82.5 ... ... ... 1923 ... 60.7 ... ...
1894 93.8 ... ... ... 1924 ... 76.9 ... ...
1895 86.8 ... ... ... 1925 ... 96.1 ... ...
1896 95.6 ... ... ... 1926 ... 107.9 ... ...
1897 94.0 ... ... ... 1927 ... 112.4 ... ...
1898 96.5 ... ... ... 1928 ... 118.2 1370 ...
1899 102.4 ... ... ... 1929 ... ... 1386 ...
1900 100.2 ... 1237 ... 1930 ... ... 1448 ...
1901 102.7 ... ... ... 1931 ... ... 1462 ...
1902 111.6 ... ... ... 1932 ... ... 1439 ...
1903 103.9 ... ... ... 1933 ... ... 1493 ...
1904 114.9 ... ... ... 1934 ... ... 1630 ...
1905 101.7 ... ... ... 1935 ... ... 1864 ...
1906 97.2 ... ... ... 1936 ... ... 1991 ...
1907 93.4 ... ... ... 1937 ... ... 2156 ...
1908 102.0 ... ... ... 1938 ... ... 2150 ...
1909 105.9 ... ... ... 1939 ... ... 2237 ...
1910 113.0 ... ... ... 1940 ... ... 2144 1309
1911 104.4 ... ... ... 1941 ... ... ... ...
1912 112.8 ... ... ... 1942 ... ... ... ...
1913 118.5 122.0 1488 ... 1943 ... ... ... 1363
1914 ... 116.5 ... ... 1944 ... ... ... ...
1945 ... ... ... 1226
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Table F-3 (continued)
Maddison, Maddison,
inter- inter-
Gregory, M&H, national Harrison, Gregory, M&H, national Harrison,
rubles of rubles of dollars rubles of rubles of rubles of dollars rubles of
1913 1913 of 1990 1937 1913 1913 of 1990 1937
1946 ... ... 1913 ... 1976 ... ... 6363 ...
1947 ... ... 2126 ... 1977 ... ... 6454 ...
1948 ... ... 2402 ... 1978 ... ... 6559 ...
1949 ... ... 2623 ... 1979 ... ... 6472 ...
1950 ... ... 2841 ... 1980 ... ... 6427 ...
1951 ... ... 2806 ... 1981 ... ... 6432 ...
1952 ... ... 2937 ... 1982 ... ... 6535 ...
1953 ... ... 3013 ... 1983 ... ... 6684 ...
1954 ... ... 3106 ... 1984 ... ... 6708 ...
1955 ... ... 3313 ... 1985 ... ... 6707 ...
1956 ... ... 3566 ... 1986 ... ... 6921 ...
1957 ... ... 3576 ... 1987 ... ... 6950 ...
1958 ... ... 3777 ... 1988 ... ... 7040 ...
1959 ... ... 3669 ... 1989 ... ... 7109 ...
1960 ... ... 3945 ... 1990 ... ... 6890 ...
1961 ... ... 4098 ... 1991 ... ... 6419 ...
1962 ... ... 4140 ... 1992 ... ... 5470 ...
1963 ... ... 3985 ... 1993 ... ... 4928 ...
1964 ... ... 4439 ... 1994 ... ... 4247 ...
1965 ... ... 4634 ... 1995 ... ... 4025 ...
1966 ... ... 4804 ... 1996 ... ... 3911 ...
1967 ... ... 4963 ... 1997 ... ... 3995 ...
1968 ... ... 5202 ... 1998 ... ... 3907 ...
1969 ... ... 5225 ... 1999 ... ... 4098 ...
1970 ... ... 5575 ... 2000 ... ... 4454 ...
1971 ... ... 5667 ... 2001 ... ... 4741 ...
1972 ... ... 5643 ... 2002 ... ... 5006 ...
1973 ... ... 6059 ... 2003 ... ... 5397 ...
1974 ... ... 6176 ... 2004 ... ... 5852 ...
1975 ... ... 6135 ... 2005 ... ... 6264 ...
2006 ... ... 6766 ...
Sources:
Gregory, 1885-1913 (Russian Empire territory): Gregory (1980, pp. 56-57).
M&H, 1913-1928 (Soviet interwar territory): Table 5.
Maddison, 1900, 1913, 1928-1940, and 1946-2006 (Soviet post-1945 territory): http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.
Harrison, 1940, 1943, and 1945 (Soviet controlled territory): GDP from Harrison (1996, p. 92); population from
Harrison (1996, p. 104), and Andreev, Darskii, and Khar'kova (1990, pp. 25-27).
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